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Abstract 
 
The uplands of Northern Vietnam are home to the poorest of the rural poor. Inhabitants of these areas are 
faced with low agricultural productivity and the ecosystem services such as food production for 
marginalized populations, biodiversity reservoirs, and watershed regulating functions have been under 
increasing pressure due to decollectivisation and the following redistribution of the land, liberalization of 
markets and a rapid population growth. To partly reverse the threat posed to the ecosystem services, we 
analyzed the impact of alternative schemes on farm revenues that would set aside cultivated land for 
forest natural re-growth. Using mathematical programming we developed a farm household model in 
which we investigated scenarios where some land in the sloping area of the catchment is set aside for 
forest natural re-growth (which aims at restoration of watershed functions), while additional land is made 
irrigable in the lowland compartment of the farms. In the first part of this thesis we will impose different 
implementation and compensation schemes for this land set-aside schemes and analyze their effects on 
both a household as well as a village level. In the second part of this thesis we will analyze the different 
land set-aside schemes with the help of the theory on Payment for Environmental Services (PES) that 
examines the cut-off point where farmers will voluntarily set-aside sloping land in order to get more 
access to water in the bottom valleys. The compensation schemes are analyzed from two perspectives; 
on the one hand they will improve collective water infrastructures so that more water is made available in 
the lowlands; on the other hand they will individually reward farm households by allocating new terrace 
land. The impacts on land use, individual farm revenues, per head revenues and village revenues were 
analyzed. This led us to conclude that relatively small increases in irrigable land in the lower 
compartments are necessary to compensate for the revenues lost of land set-aside on the sloping land. 
Moreover, some of the scenarios comprehend a better wealth distribution among members of the villages. 
However, this would require some coordination at village or commune levels, and a deliberate choice to 
help the poorly endowed households. 
 
Key Words: farm household modeling, non-separable models, Vietnam, subsistence farming, payment 
for environmental services 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, life has changed dramatically for the people of Northern mountainous areas of 
Vietnam. The two main drivers of change were the shift from collectivism towards a market system and 
the rapid population growth. These led to a return to slash-and-burn cultivation in the uplands with 
increasingly short fallow periods, which in turn caused increased deforestation (Castella et al., 2005). 
These practices pose a threat to the important ecosystem services available in the region; besides food 
production for marginalized populations, the ecosystems also provide important functions as biodiversity 
reservoirs and watershed regulation. If current practices continue, the ecosystems will most likely 
deteriorate, which will pose large dangers on the existence of all living beings and the food supply of 
future generations in the areas (Castella and Dang, 2002). 
 
To protect or restore forest resources, local authorities have proposed farmers to set-aside some of their 
cultivated land in sloping areas to re-establish natural or productive forests. For example, as part of 
national policies, the authorities of Giang Cay village in Van Chan district have successfully prohibited the 
cultivation of upland rice by better-off farmers. The implementation of these policies has however been 
faced by mixed success. At least in the short run, setting-aside sloping land is costly for the farm 
households involved, as they get even less access to already scarce land. In the long run, however, more 
forests in the upper part of the catchment could indirectly benefit the households, because they may 
result in increased availability of irrigation water for the lowlands. Moreover, the improvement of 
ecosystem services to the region justifies supporting policies to compensate some of the costs. A suitable 
policy could be the improvement of collective irrigation infrastructures or allocation of additional terrace 
land for the lowlands.  
 
Before deciding on possible set-aside regulations and compensation policies, policymakers need to gain 
ex-ante knowledge on their costs and benefits at the household level, as these will greatly affect 
acceptance and compliance. Our main objective is therefore to analyze the household and village-level 
impact of alternative schemes for setting-aside cultivated land for forest natural re-growth in combination 
with different options for improved irrigation. In the first part of this study, we distinguish various possible 
distributions to set-aside upland area and improve lowland water availability aimed at different types of 
farmers in order to gain insight in the potential distribution of costs and benefits. In the second part of this 
study the different set-aside schemes are applied to the theory of Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES). With the help of this theory, we examine the effects of two possible PES-like programs. In the first 
one the set-aside of upland area and payments shaped by the construction of water infrastructures are 
collectively organized at the village level. In the second one, the PES-like program is organized via 
individual resource flows between the users of environmental services that pay a tax in order to construct 
new terraces and the providers of environmental services that set-aside upland area. 
 
Smallholder farmers in developing countries are not simple profit maximizers. As they face multiple 
market imperfections, they have to balance factors such as availability of land and family labor, food 
consumption requirements, and market access. In such a setting, a change in resource availability will 
affect the entire farming system, and its consequences can not be assessed using cost benefit analysis. 
Because we measure the impact of an ex ante change in resource endowments for farmers, statistical 
analysis that is characterized by measuring impacts ex post would not be a correct methodology to be 
used in this study either. We therefore use a farm household modeling (FHM) approach. This approach 
explicitly models the objectives, resources, possible activities and the socio-economic environment of the 
farm household and has been used extensively over the past decades to assess the effects of policy 
measures on farm households (e.g., Holden and Shiferaw, 2004; Kruseman and Bade, 1998; Laborte et 
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al., 2009; Van den Berg et al., 2007).  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature on farm household modeling and Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES). It assesses the effects of policy-induced land set-aside schemes and 
introduces possible compensation schemes for its adoption. The model results allow for an ex ante 
analysis of land set-aside and water addition schemes under the assumption that farm households are 
rational units who behave in an income-maximizing way. Obviously, all decisions made by the farm 
household are taken within the constraints (land, labor, credit etc.) and opportunities of cropping activities 
and off-farm work that the households face. The solutions of the model will first show the loss of possible 
land set-aside schemes and gain of water-addition schemes per type of farm household group in 
comparison to a base situation, which represents the current situation of farming practices in the area. It 
will then search for the cut-off points that represent the compensation of different ways of additional 
irrigation water in return for different set-aside schemes. This study adds to the existing literature on PES 
by examining the impact of a non-monetary payment regulated from not only an individual farm 
household, but also a communal perspective.  
 
The structure of this study is as follows; in the next chapter we will provide a short overview of the study 
area and its socio-economic conditions. Thereafter, we will link the characteristics of the study area to the 
existing theory on market imperfections and the implications on the non-separability of the model. In the 
4th chapter we will group the data acquired during field research according to an already existing typology. 
These three chapters together form the basis of the farm household model, as it is explained in chapter 5. 
The farm household model is first applied to the base run scenario in chapter 6, where after an 
explanation on the different land set-aside and water addition schemes follows. These scenarios will be 
imposed to the different types of farm households and the impacts of the scenarios will be analyzed. The 
theoretical framework of PES in chapter 9 will explain how PES can be applied to the imposed set-aside 
schemes. The GAMS model will be used to examine the cut-off points between the set-aside of land and 
additional irrigation for different types of farm households. We will end the study with a conclusion and 
discussion. 
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2. Study area 
 
Introduction 
The study was carried out in Van Chan district, which is part of the mountainous province of Yen Bai, 
situated in the North-West of Vietnam (Figure 1). The province is situated 150 km North-East of Hanoi, 
has a total area of 6900 km² and a population of around 
750,000 inhabitants. The highest altitude in the province is 
2500 meter and the main crops cultivated are irrigated and 
rainfed rice, maize and tea. Van Chan district has a total 
surface of 1205 km² and its 31 communes form a total 
population of around 140,000 (GSO, 2008). The majority of the 
people living in this area belong to one of the ethnic minorities 
of the Thai, Tay, Dao or H’mong and a village is mostly 
composed of one ethnic group. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Vietnam.  Figure 2: Map of study area 
 
Villages studied 
Within the district of Van Chan, four villages in different communes have been selected to gather data on 
household characteristics, crop production and other activities of farmers. These are represented in 
Figure 2 above. The villages have been selected based upon the different availability in types of agro-
ecological zones, the different ethnicities living in these areas, the different crops grown and the different 
access to markets. 
 
The first village selected is Pang Cang in the commune of Suoi Giang. This village is chosen for its low 
amount of irrigated lowland. To compensate for this shortage in irrigated lowland, farmers tend to 
intensively cultivate the uplands. As for the perennial crops, Suoi Giang is famous for its special variety of 
tea. The people of this village belong to the ethnic minority group of the H’mong. Earlier research showed 
that land degradation in the uplands is high in this village, mainly due to the cultivation methods of 
farmers (Do et al., 2007).  
 
The second village is Giang Cay in the commune Nam Lanh, where the people belong to the ethnic 
minority Dao. This village is much differentiated in the amount of irrigated lowland that they have available. 
The village authorities prohibited the cultivation of upland rice as part of a project to preserve the hillsides. 
After the price drop in tea, the crop has not been cultivated for sale in this village anymore. Two other 
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cash crops that are cultivated here are ginger and cinnamon.  
 
The third village is Ban Tun in the commune Tu Lé, which is characterized by its relatively large amount of 
irrigated lowland during the dry and wet season available. The ethnic minority Tai living here do not 
specialize in any cash crops except for a special variety of sticky rice.  
 
Lastly, the village Nam Chau in the commune Nam Bung has been investigated because of its relatively 
large amount of newly constructed terraces. Access to water is however low here, which is at least part of 
the reason that people only cultivate one cycle of irrigated rice per year. The inhabitants of this village 
also belong to the ethnic minority Dao and cultivate cardamom as an important perennial crop.  
 
Agro-ecological zones 
Despite their different availabilities in agro-ecological zones and different altitudes, the households of the 
villages are largely organized in the same way and at least to some extent possess all types of agro-
ecological zones, on which they mainly cultivate the same crops. Figure 3 below shows the typical 
division in agro-ecological zones within one village. 
 
Figure 3. Agro-ecological division within a village. 
 
On the bottom left of Figure 3 we find the first agro-ecological zone; irrigated lowland with access to water 
during the spring and summer season. This can be either paddy or terrace land and is generally 
cultivated for a long time and passed from generation to generation. The owner of this land usually 
possesses a “redbook”, the official document for tenure, for the land. The next agro-ecological zone, 
irrigated lowland with only access to water during the summer season, is established more recently. This 
land can be mostly defined as terrace land, but also paddy exists here. Ownership in the form of a 
redbook is quite common for this type of land. These two types of agro-ecological zones are the only 
ones that receive access to irrigation water. Currently, the farmers of the villages do not construct new 
terraces because they are not able to fetch the water. A solution for this, an improvement in water 
infrastructures, is laid out in Chapter 8. Due to a lack of reliable data, we did not take a specific water 
balance into account for the lowland agro-ecological zones, but only took into account whether there was 
access to water during the summer or spring and summer season. The sloping area consists of relatively 
newly acquired land on which a range of upland crops, often with fallow periods in between, are cultivated. 
Just before the distant forests perennials are cultivated. For both sloping land as well as perennial land 
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farmers do not own a redbook. However, the land is passed on from generation to generation and to 
whom the land belongs is common knowledge for all villagers. Therefore, we will treat all agro-ecological 
zones as if full ownership would exist. 
 
Crops cultivated 
For the cultivation of the main staple crop in the lowlands, irrigated rice, there are two distinct seasons: a 
dry (December till May) and a wet (June till October) season. Upland crops are generally cultivated 
between March and November and can have two cropping seasons. The upland crops cultivated in this 
region are upland rice, maize, peanuts, cassava, soybean, sweet potato and ginger. Apart from those, 
three perennial crops are grown; tea, cardamom and cinnamon. These crops can be cultivated in different 
rotations and while using different levels of inputs. The exact crops cultivated and their periods of 
cultivation differ somewhat between communes, but the sequence of activities and practices was the 
same in all communities. This allowed us to establish a general cropping calendar for each crop, as can 
be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 
PL = Prepare Land, TR = Transplanting, WE = Weeding, HA = Harvesting, SE = Seeding / Planting 
Figure 4: General Cropping Calendar 
 
Irrigation Systems 
An earlier study conducted in the research area highlighted the complexity of irrigation systems and its 
influences on the cultural practices of farmers (Vidal, 2009). Water usage in Van Chan broadly serves 
three purposes: for domestic use, to generate hydroelectricity and for agricultural use. For domestic use it 
is important that we do not only pay attention to the quantity of water available, but also to the quality. In 
certain areas of Van Chan, people have been forced to move due to returning diseases for reasons of 
poor water quality. Within the whole of Vietnam, hydroelectric plants have been built. This has also been 
the case for Van Chan, which caused a reasonable amount of damage to the fields of some farmers. 
Farmers did get compensated for this damage (a non-recurrent compensation between €0.60 and €0.90 
per m2). The last function of the water is agriculture; farmers are organized in ‘blocks’ of around six 
families in which they collectively manage access to water to their fields and the maintenance of the 
collective irrigation system. In these watershed regulation systems, there is often a distinction between 
upstream and downstream economic agents, where the upstream farmers have to take downstream 
effects into account when making decisions on their land use. Per block, upstream and downstream 
farmers coordinate their cropping calendars (preparation of land, transplanting etc.) where upstream 
farmers practice their farming activities just before downstream farmers. However, this collective structure 
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sometimes goes hand in hand with individual actions that may lead to conflict. Moreover, irrigation is 
generally not equally distributed between different types of farm households.  
 
Previous studies on sustainable cultivation 
The local governments in Yen Bai province aim for a more sustainable management of the ecosystems. 
In line with this aim is the closing down of the uplands for the cultivation of upland rice in Giang Cay. Food 
self-sufficiency is however one of the main strategies of the farmers in the province. Possible ways to 
sustain the ecosystems while at the same time trying to meet food self-sufficiency have been extensively 
investigated in the area with the help of conservation agriculture such as mulch-based cropping systems 
(Affholder et al., 2010). However, this research led to the conclusion that cropping systems based on 
mulching techniques still need quite a number of improvements in order to be adopted by farmers.  
 
Jourdain et al. (2009) showed that a possible set-aside program in Van Chan, aimed at a reduction of 
25% of upland area available for cultivation, ceteris paribus, would lead to a sharp decrease in soil fertility 
in the remaining cropping areas. Moreover, because of the likelihood that degradation will shift instead of 
stop, overall environmental effects may be negative as well. Only with compensation, these negative 
effects could be turned into positive ones. In order for farmers to meet their food needs, they have to be 
compensated for their loss in food production resulting from a possible land set-aside. Possible ways of 
compensation mentioned in the article are direct provision for part of their food requirements, in-kind 
insurance mechanisms that act upon farmer’s risk-averse behavior regarding staple food production or 
the provision of improved agricultural technologies that would increase yields. Unless farmers are being 
compensated, they are obviously unlikely to take part in a land set-aside program voluntarily (Jourdain et 
al. 2009).  
 
Market constraints 
In the late ‘80s, economic reforms, also referred to as “Doi Moi”, initiated a transition from the collective 
system to market liberalization in the mountainous areas of Vietnam (Castella, Dang, 2002). However, the 
four villages investigated still face some major market constraints. These are related to the factor (labor, 
land, capital) and product markets. For the labor market, only a certain amount of labor can be hired-out. 
Moreover, there is a transaction cost on hiring-in and hiring-out labor representing the costs needed for 
the farmer and employer to find each other. A land market does not exist in the area, which means that 
transactions in terms of sale or renting of land do not occur. There is no official market for credit; however, 
farmers found alternatives for this imperfection as will be explained in the next section. Therefore, the 
market is assumed to function perfectly. Regarding imperfections in the product market, some crops can 
only be sold in limited quantities and for all crops there is a large gap between the farm-gate price and the 
consumer (retail) price. In the following chapter, we will explain these imperfections and price bands with 
the help of the theory on market failures and non-separability and examine their implications on the 
mathematical model to be established. 
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3. Market Failures and Non-Separability 
 
Introduction 
Farm households maximize profits subject to (1) the trade-offs with other goals, (2) resource constraints 
and (3) working of markets (Ellis, 1988). Farmers in developing countries are often both producer and 
consumer. Producers try to maximize net revenues relative to their product and factor levels, given the 
market price, fixed factors and technology restrictions that they face. Consumers aim at maximizing their 
utility of the bundles of goods that they can consume, given the market price, disposable income, 
household characteristics and other constraints that they have to overcome (Sadoulet, de Janvry; 1995). 
In this section we will explain how these goals can be interrelated and how they apply to the farmers 
cultivating the uplands of Northern Vietnam.  
 
Separable and Non-Separable Models 
In perfect markets, where all products and factors can be traded, the opportunity cost of a product or 
factor of the household is equal to the buying price (Sadoulet, de Janvry; 1995). In the perfect 
neoclassical market scenario there are no market failures and prices for all goods are determined 
exogenously through the markets. The market prices reflect the opportunity costs for food production and 
consumption and free time. Households choices on crop production and leisure consumption do not 
depend on each other, because they can hire in labor for the same price as reflected by their own 
opportunity cost for crop production. Similarly, as long as perfect markets exist, the farmer is indifferent 
between consuming its own produced food or buying it from the market. Food can be sold at the market, 
whereby the farmer will gain more profits, can hire in labor from the money obtained and decide to devote 
more time to leisure. Hence, the farmer now buys free time, valued at the market wage rate. Therefore, 
the optimal situation of the farmer is one where markets are fully functioning because in this situation 
farmers are free to choose whether or not to use the market and do not have to deal with the market 
constraints (Taylor, Adelman; 2002). The farm household acts as a profit maximizing unit, where all 
decisions can be taken by first considering production decisions that lead to a certain profit level and in 
turn will affect consumption, but consumption does not influence the production decisions (Janvry, 
Sadoulet; 2006). This is what defines the classical separable household model.  
 
In reality however, there are often market failures that lead prices to become endogenous. According to 
de Janvry et al. (1996), market failures occur “when the disutility created from the cost of a transaction 
through the market is greater than the utility gain that it produces, which leads to people not using the 
market for the transaction”. In order to overcome this disutility, farm households may invent alternative 
institutions to replace the market failures or the transaction simply does not occur. If the cost of a market 
imperfection become that high that participating is not viable anymore, the optimal strategy of the 
household may become self-sufficiency. Hence, market failures may lead farmers to seek the objective of 
reaching food self-sufficiency. 
 
If markets for both labor and food are non-existent, farmers are confronted with a direct trade-off between 
producing food and consuming leisure and will produce till the point where the shadow value of producing 
one more unit of food is equal to the valuation of household time. Shadow values represent the point of 
equality between the marginal utility of food and leisure consumption and the marginal productivity of 
labor. When the farmer makes a decision on production, labor allocation and consumption, he may make 
producer and consumer decisions that are dependent upon each other (Taylor, Adelman; 2003). Under 
these circumstances, farmers are not able to separate their production and consumption decisions 
anymore. Influential in these kind of non-separable models are Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986). Non-
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separable models occur when there are imperfections in more than one market. They imply that 
consumption characteristics influence production decisions. We will discuss two types of market failures; 
(1) a transaction cost / price band that leads to a difference between the buying and selling price, (2) a 
limited possibility to engage in the market that leads to a limitation on the amount that can be bought or 
sold, of which the most extreme case is a non-existing market. 
 
Transaction Costs and Price Bands 
Transaction costs may include the distance from the market, poor infrastructure that increases 
transportation costs, mark-ups by intermediaries, opportunity costs involved in searching for the buyer 
and the seller to meet each other and more households specific transaction costs. These costs are 
variable, meaning that they change according to the volume of units produced or bought. They drive a 
wedge between the farm-gate and consumer price, the so-called price band. This is a positive price 
interval that may lead farmers to decide not to engage in the market. When the selling price of the farmer 
falls within this interval, the household will adjust production and consumption decisions to each other and 
start cultivating for own-consumption (Janvry, Sadoulet; 2006). For the producer side of the household, 
the selling price is larger than the market price minus transaction costs, so it can better supply the good to 
itself. For the consumer side of the household, the selling price is lower than the market price, so it can 
better purchase the good from itself (Taylor, Adelman; 2003). Logically, the price band that an individual 
household faces fluctuates from year to year; when harvests are good, the lower bound of the price band 
falls and when harvests are bad, the upper bound of the price band rises.  
 
Quantity Restriction 
There may be a limited possibility to engage in market activities up to the point where the market does not 
exist. The constraint to market participation works in the following way; once the maximum level of 
participation has been reached, the household must find its internal equilibrium between the demand and 
supply that is leftover. This equilibrium defines a shadow value that acts upon the resource endowments, 
demand characteristics and the level of the constraint of the household. This internal equilibrium is again 
non-separable (de Janvry et al., 1996).  
 
Application to the Study Area 
In our case, the market failures are that important, that a non-separable household approach should be 
followed. This because the market failures occur in both the factor (labor, land and capital) and the 
product market. A market for land does not exist, which means that participation in any form (sell, buy, 
hire-in or hire-out of land) is not possible. For the market of capital, we assume a perfectly working market. 
There is a limitation on the amount of labor that can be hired out whereas there is no limitation on the 
amount of labor that can be hired-in by farmers. Transaction costs do however occur in the whole labor 
market. A price band between the farm-gate and consumer (retail) price in the product market exists. We 
will here analyze these market imperfections per factor and product market and their implications for non-
separability. 
 
Factor Market 
Market failures in the labor market occur in the study area, amongst others because the position of the 
villages is isolated from outside labor markets and because almost all inhabitants belong to ethnic 
minorities, a typical household characteristic that does not seem to help them in finding off-farm work. For 
the labor market, there is not only a transaction cost on hiring-in and hiring-out labor from the farm, but 
also a constraint on the amount of labor that can be engaged in off-farm work. The transaction costs are 
lower for labor that is hired-in and -out between farmers within the same village than for labor that is 
hired-out to engage in off-farm work outside the village. The marginal productivity of labor may be much 
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differentiated across farm households, which may lead the labor market to fail for only those types of farm 
households where the shadow value of labor is larger than the price band. 
 
Opportunities to engage in off-farm work are often restricted to certain periods of the year, depending on 
the village and the type of farm household. Where market access for some farm households may be 
better than for others, none of the households could decide to fully engage in off-farm work and give up 
on cropping activities. Furthermore, there are certain members of the household who cannot participate in 
the labor market due to reasons of tradition, age and gender. Female labor is generally used to work on 
the farm. Child labor is usually spend to do some tasks in and around the house and herd animals. The 
limited possibility for off-farm work is likely to leave the farmers, due to the very restricted area of land that 
they have, with an abundance of labor in the household. This will lower the shadow wage of the 
household and stimulate farmers to produce for food production and/or devote more time to leisure 
consumption. The lower shadow wage can transform a previously non-tradable, for example cash crops, 
into a tradable (Taylor, Adelman; 2002). 
 
In our study area, a market for land does not exist. This means that transactions in terms of sale, buy or 
renting of land do not occur. Furthermore, there is no official credit market to which farmers have access. 
If farmers face food constraints during certain time periods of the year, the most common way of solving 
these is by borrowing rice from friends and relatives. For credit constraints on the use of inputs, lending 
from traders can be a possibility for farmers, where repayment normally occurs after the harvest. Hence, 
farmers have access to short term credit; i.e. for the period of one cropping year. It would however be 
difficult for farmers to obtain long term credit composed of more than one year. Therefore, farmers do not 
have access to complete credit mechanisms that allow them to smoothen their consumption between 
years. Therefore, they are likely to reduce exposure to risk through the adjustment of income strategies. 
This may lead the farmer to adopt less risky activities such as greater diversification of income sources, 
food security considerations and lower levels of investments in soil conservation. In our case, income 
strategies to reduce risk are the choice of activities and production decisions. Especially the poor farm 
households adopt a more diversified crop portfolio and use less high yielding varieties that are more 
profitable but also more risky. This leads food self-sufficiency to become a second goal of farm 
households against price risks in food markets (de Janvry, Sadoulet, 2006). Our analysis composes one 
cropping year and therefore does not take long term credit into account and assumes a perfect working 
market for credit. 
 
Product Market 
There is a price band between the selling and buying price for all crops produced. The market failure 
constrain the abilities of farmers to respond to price incentives and modernization opportunities and lead 
them to shift to food and labor that they cannot trade (de Janvry et al., 1996). One of the reasons for this 
is that the land allocated to food crops can only be minimally reduced, which leads to a reduction in the 
supply response of more favorable cash crops such as ginger and the cross-price elasticity of the food 
crop with respect to the cash crop. Therefore, the positive supply response for cash crops can only lead 
to a small substitution of cash crops by staple food crops and farmers only give a minimal response to 
price changes. 
 
As will be explained in the next chapter, the households of this study are very diversified. Therefore, using 
the product markets may represent a gain for some households, but a loss for others, leading only those 
households that gain from trading via the product market to use it. However, the more shallow the local 
food and labor markets, the more the prices are correlated with shadow price movements, which leads 
farmers to be more likely to produce for self-sufficiency. 
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For some crops, such as ginger and sweet potato, there is also a constraint on the quantity that can be 
sold on the market. For ginger, the market is easily satiated. Because it is often not directly clear how 
much of the crop is exactly cultivated within the village, prices fluctuate highly from year to year. This 
would lead a risk-averse farmer to only spend a very limited amount of his resources to the cultivation of 
ginger, since he would probably only be able to sell a very limited amount for a reasonable price.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the farm households of our study area do not just act as pure profit maximizers. 
They face market and resource constraints that lead them to not be able to separate production and 
consumption decisions anymore. Moreover, they adopt the goal of food self-sufficiency next to their 
primary goal of income maximization. In order to overcome the market imperfections that farmers face, 
they build different institutional arrangements to act as surrogates for what the markets do not provide; 
farmers exchange labor among each other in periods of intensive cultivation, they borrow rice from each 
other that will be paid back after harvest or pay sellers of farm inputs with part of the harvest. 
 
The simulation of farm household’s behavior with a linear programming model allows the analysis of 
farmers behavior beyond analytical results. The use of it in this study is to understand the impact of an 
exogenous shock in land endowments on farm household behavior. In a farm household model, we can 
only change the exogenous variables that will in turn influence the endogenous shadow values that the 
farmers face. Here, we proved that the decision of the farmer to engage in a market is an endogenous 
one that is shaped by the shadow values of the household and the market imperfections.  
 
Furthermore, we showed that non-separability is a distinct farm household and village characteristic and 
not a market characteristic. Namely, the shadow values that a farm household faces are determined by 
their own characteristics and that of the village. Therefore, it is extremely important to consider the 
heterogeneity between households and the specific village characteristics. The characteristics of a farm 
household lead it to decide whether or not to participate in the market and to be a net-buyer or a net-
seller of food (de Janvry, Sadoulet; 2006). In the following chapter, we will make the distinction between 
different types of households based on an existing household typology. 
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4. Farm Household Typology and Data 
 
Introduction 
During the transition from collectivism to a market economy, lowland fields were redistributed among 
members of cooperatives. These changes in land tenure policy caused a very unequal distribution of 
lowland among different ethnicities (Erout, Castella, 2004; Castella et al., 2005; Jourdain et al., 2010; 
Sikor, Doa, 2000) and different households in the region. Moreover, the transmission of land between 
generations, induced by gender differences and the informal rule that prohibits the construction of new 
terraces upstream of existing terraces without the approval of potentially affected persons, has 
contributed to an increased differentiation in landholdings among farm households. 
 
Farm Household Typology 
In order to measure the differences in endowments between farm households, a typology of different 
types of households was constructed in an earlier study (Jourdain et al., 2010). For this typology, the two 
communes of Nam Bung and Suoi Giang were selected based on their contrasting access to markets. 
Within these two communes, two catchments were selected, based on their differences in lowland area 
available; Sai Luong in Nam Bung and Pang Cang in Suoi Giang with respectively a large and small 
amount of lowland available. Within each of the catchments, 60 households were randomly selected 
using a semi-closed questionnaire aimed at collecting data on household characteristics such as the 
number of adults and children, production factors such as land and capital endowments, participation in 
labor and product markets and the access to water and level of control of households in irrigation water. 
With the help of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on all variables, the most discriminating 
combinations of variables were selected. Thereafter, a hierarchical ascending classification (with Ward 
links) on centered and reduced retained variables using the procedure hcluster of software package R 
was conducted (Everitt, 2005). Two indicators, the Caliński-Harabasz statistics, and the Silhouette index 
were used as a numerical aid to determine the number of groups. The groups were then visually 
confirmed through a second PCA. Subsequently, the typological groups were analyzed in details with a 
broader set of variables describing the households. This led to a selection of six contrasted typological 
household groups with different endowments and related strategies: 
 
Group 1: Water and Land Scarce is characterized by a small landholding, no irrigation water and a low 
human capital (lowest adult education index of all groups). They could be considered as the most 
vulnerable group; their landholding is very small, with almost all their land situated in the sloping areas. In 
order to meet their food requirements, they cultivate almost all their land with staple crops, which is likely 
to decrease soil fertility. Because these households are generally also the ones with a very restrictive 
access to markets, their opportunities to work off-farm are limited as well. 
Group 2: Water Scarce, Land Rich. This group is faced with a very limited access to water, but does have 
large areas of sloping land and tea available. Contrary to the previous group, they are connected to the 
market and are therefore able to sell a large amount of their products, which they mainly seem to do in 
order to offset their lack of access to water. 
Group 3: Off-Farm Work represent a small group of households that have been established for a long 
time, are endowed with a large workforce and therefore a low amount of irrigated lowland per head. 
Therefore, they have largely turned towards off-farm work. 
Group 4: Terraces and Uplanders are large households, which have been established for a long time. 
They have a large area of terraces in their possession, but these areas generally do not get a lot of water 
during the spring season and the household is faced with a large amount of mouths to feed, which leaves 
them with a rice production per head of the household that is close to self-sufficiency. 
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Group 5: Terraces and Perennials. This group has a large share of terraces available with good access to 
water. The slopes are mainly cultivated with staple crops, but they also have a large amount of perennial 
crops available. 
Group 6: Paddy Rich. This group has a large area of paddy land available, which receives a lot of water 
during the spring season. Furthermore, this group cultivates staple and perennial crops on the slopes. 
 
Farm Household Data 
The differentiation in endowments of farm households, based on the different agro-ecological zones, 
distribution of land and access to markets, will lead different farm households to react differently on 
policy-induced changes such as the land set-aside and water improvement schemes analyzed in this 
study. In order to get more detailed data of the farmers living in the four villages of our study area, we 
interviewed 45 households with the help of a semi-structured questionnaire. This concerned an in-depth 
analysis on their household characteristics, livestock, crops cultivated on each plot of land, the activities 
and inputs that those crops require and the yield they obtained during the calendar year 2008-2009 on 
the specific plots, the off-farm and non-farm activities, assets possessed and a food balance on whether 
or not self-sufficiency in rice and other staple crops was obtained. To cover all these aspects, three 
rounds of questionnaires with each farm household were conducted, which also gave us the chance to 
check data that appeared unclear or incorrect. A representative member of each household was 
interviewed, where we tried to get a sample of male and female respondents, but for traditional and 
cultural reasons in Vietnam, this was often the head of the household, who, in almost all cases, was male. 
The households have been selected via a stratified random sample in which we focused on whether the 
household was classified as a poor household or not and on their amount of paddy and terrace land 
available, since we assumed that this latter criteria is highly correlated with the well-being of the 
household.  
 
The data collected were then grouped according to the six types of farm households identified in the 
typology. Within each typology group, one representative farm household was selected for the farm 
household model. Their main characteristics and the proportions according to the typology data are 
shown in table one below. 
 
Table 1: Farm household’s main characteristics 
  
Water 
and 
Land 
Scarce 
Water 
Scarce, 
Land 
Rich 
Off-Farm 
Work 
Terraces 
and 
Uplanders 
Terraces 
and 
Perennials 
Paddy 
Rich 
N a) 37 16 7 14 16 22 
Proportion (%) a) 33 14 6 13 14 20 
Household size (pers.) 4 5 7 6 8 6 
Family labor force (man-year) 2 2 5 3.5 5 3.5 
Land available in each zone per farm household (m2)  
Paddy (spring and summer irrigation) 0 0 200 100 200 1500 
Paddy (summer irrigation) 0 0 1500 250 250 3000 
Terraces (spring and summer irrigation) 0 0 0 1000 300 0 
Terraces (summer irrigation) 200 500 800 3000 2100 0 
Sloping land 6500 14000 7800 16000 8000 15000 
Perennials 600 6000 200 5000 9000 4500 
Total Area (m2) 7 300 20 500 10 500 25 350 19 850 24 000 
a)
 of all households based on a hypothetical village according to typology data   
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Cropping Systems 
The diversification in land endowments for different types of farm households is also reflected in the land 
use patterns that they adopt, as can be seen in Figure 4 below. Farmers use all the land that they have 
available for the cultivation of crops. If water on irrigated lowland is available during two seasons, farmers 
will cultivate two cycles of irrigated rice on the land. If water is only available during the summer season, 
the lowland will remain fallow during the spring season and will be cultivated with irrigated rice during the 
summer season. Upland rotation systems are mainly adopted by those farm households that cannot meet 
their food requirements by the cultivation of rice in the lowlands. These crop rotations allow those farmers 
to acquire additional rice yields by the cultivation of upland rice. Other main crops cultivated by farmers 
include maize and cassava, which is mainly used as feed for livestock. The perennial crops tea, 
cardamom and cinnamon are highly dependent on the altitude and climatic conditions and therefore differ 
per village investigated and not per farm household type. For this reason, these perennials are 
aggregated in the Figure below. 
 
 
Figure 5: Survey results of cropping systems cultivated 
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5. Farm household model 
 
Introduction 
The whole-farm model is built using mathematical programming (Hazell Norton, 1986) and developed on 
a GAMS-platform (Rosenthal, 2007) of which a mathematical description can be found in annex 1. This 
model was designed in order to reproduce the behavior of farm households that have to select a set of 
crop and off-farm activities under constraints with respect to available production factors, technical 
opportunities and food consumption requirements; and how these would change with changing 
endowments in sloping land and a changing access to water. Therefore, we developed optimization 
models that incorporate essential characteristics of each representative farmer and the environment in 
which they operate per type of farm household grouped according to the typology above.  
 
Objectives 
In this study, we analyzed the impact of land set-aside and water addition schemes on different types of 
farm households by focusing on two objectives. The first objective of the farm household model is 
maximization of the discretionary income. With this objective, it is assumed that farmers can reach their 
highest possible welfare. We formulated a cash balance that is composed of incomes coming from the 
sale of crop products and wages of off-farm activities, the purchase of staple food crops, inputs for crops 
cultivated and wages paid for labor that is hired into the farm.  
 
The second objective included in the model is food self-sufficiency. Farmers have a preference for rice, 
which is reflected by a linear weight loss in the objective function; a positive rice shortage will negatively 
affect the objective function. Hereby, the second objective of food self sufficiency is included in a second 
objective function of utility maximization. The total income, outputs, capital, land and labor allocation to 
each possible activity can be derived from the objective functions of the model.  
 
Resources 
A different initial endowment of working capital was appointed to each type of farm household. 
Furthermore, farmland was classified in six types of agro-ecological zones based on topography and 
surface irrigation, as explained in Chapter 2 and listed in table 2.1 of annex 2. Surface irrigation only 
occurred on paddy or terrace land and can be available either during the spring and summer season or 
only during the summer season. As explained before, there is no restriction on the use of water per period, 
only an indication on the availability of irrigation water on the lowland per season. Apart from irrigated 
lowland, we identified sloping land and land that belongs to perennial crops. Table 1 above shows the 
endowments in land per agro-ecological zone and the family labor available per farm household type. 
 
Activities 
The simulation horizon over which farmers based their decisions on crop cultivation and off-farm activities 
to undertake was the cropping year 2008-2009. All data on crop production is acquired via farm 
household surveys and later on checked and where necessary corrected with community officials and 
agronomists. The most important data that is entered in the linear programming model can be found in 
annex 2. These are the products produced, corresponding to land use systems and agro-ecological zone 
(table 2.2), the technologies per land use system available (table 2.3), the labor requirements per land 
use system (table 2.4) and the yields per product produced, given the technology and land use system 
(table 2.5). Livestock activities were not included in the model as an income generating activity, since it 
was not a main activity in any of the surveyed farm types and is unlikely to have a large effect on the 
results of our simulations. Depending on the type of land, we identified 28 feasible cropping systems, all 
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with a set of data on output and required labor and technologies (inputs). The 28 cropping systems 
included in the model were composed of 11 crops: 14 single-crop systems, 10 double-crop systems of 
which four are not rice-based and four specified rotation systems for crops that cannot be grown 
continuously. The composition of these crops is shown in table 2.2 of annex 2. The rotation systems are 
composed of several years but modeled according to their average yields and requirements per year.  
 
Regarding the cultivation of these crops, all farm households face some major labor peaks at certain time 
periods. Therefore, we divided the year into seven time periods corresponding to the main labor patterns 
in crop cultivation identified by the surveyed farmers, which can be found in Figure 4 above and table 2.7 
of annex 2. In each time period, the household allocates its available time between different cropping 
activities and off-farm opportunities. If family labor is not sufficient to fulfill all tasks needed on the farm, 
additional labor can be contracted. 
 
Market constraints 
As explained in the theory on non-separable models, a perfectly working market for capital in the short-
term is assumed. This means that we allowed negative cash balances during the season in the model, 
and therefore included the possibility of borrowing between different time periods. There are however also 
several market imperfections that lead the farm model to become a non-separable one. These market 
imperfections are implemented by several constraints in the model: First of all, different types of farm 
households face different proportions on the likelihood to find wage employment in the non-farm sector. 
This is represented by an equation limiting the possibility to engage in off-farm work to 40 percent of the 
total labor available within the household for all types of farm households except for the group “Off-Farm 
Work”. This latter group is characterized by their better access to markets and therefore faces a limitation 
on non-farm work of 60% of their total labor available. Furthermore, we included a 10% transaction cost 
for hiring-in and hiring-out labor for all types of farm households. These costs represent the expenses of 
finding off-farm work and making the transition to the job and back beyond the actual salary that the 
farmer either receives or has to pay. Because a land market does not exist, transactions in terms of sale 
or renting of land were not included as possible options for the modeled farmers. Regarding the product 
market, a price band between the buying and selling price of the crops produced represents the shallow 
market opportunities and will force farm households to produce for home consumption and try to reach 
food self-sufficiency (De Janvry et al., 1991). This price band is enforced by a unique difference between 
the buying and selling price for the staple crops that can be both produced and consumed, as is indicated 
in table 2.6 of annex 2. Lastly, there is a restriction on the sale of certain cash crops. Therefore, a 
constraint on the maximum amount of land to be cultivated with these crops was included. 
 
Consumption 
The crops produced by the farmers can either be sold or consumed. Moreover, if food requirements are 
not met by crop cultivation, crops can also be bought. This led to the establishment of a product balance, 
in which the household buys, sells or consumes the products that are available. For the consumption of 
staple crops, we set a constraint on the minimum consumption for the farm household and assumed that, 
in order to meet food requirements, the minimal intake of rice for one person should be 0.5 kilogram per 
day. This is in line with theory on rice needs that states that from 180 kilogram of rice per person per year, 
1576 calories per day or 75% of the requirements need to be obtained (ILO, 2000). In order to meet the 
same amount of calories, 0.45 kilogram of maize or 2.6 kilogram of fresh cassava leaves need to be 
consumed (Falcon et al., 1984). However, in order to include the utility consuming rice as opposed to 
consuming maize and cassava, we assumed that one kilogram of rice can be replaced by two kilograms 
of maize and one kilogram of maize in turn can be replaced by two kilograms of cassava. This leads to a 
hierarchy in the preferences for staple crops; only if food requirements cannot be met by the consumption 
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of rice, and farmers do not choose to buy additional rice, they will switch to the consumption of maize. 
Only if the consumption requirements cannot be met by consuming rice and maize (or by buying 
additional rice or maize), farmers will switch to the consumption of cassava. However, not all rice can be 
substituted for maize and cassava; according to agronomists from the area, at least 45% of food 
requirements has to be met by the consumption of rice. These constraints comprehend the energetic 
needs of the farm household and a preference in consumption without having to develop a full energetic 
balance (including energy, protein and other nutrition needs) to rightfully describe the consumption 
function. 
 
Conclusion 
Together, the equations implemented in the farm model, as they can be found in annex 1 , lead to the 
reproduction of the status quo of farm household behavior in the villages examined. In fact, the farm 
household model represents hypothetical farming behavior, based on an aggregation of farm household 
and environmental characteristics of the four villages examined. In the next chapter we will explain to 
what extend the base run results of the model represent current farm household behavior in the study 
area.   
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6. Base run results 
 
Introduction 
With the knowledge on farm household characteristics, the environment in which they operate and under 
current endowments, the model results in terms of cropping systems used can be analyzed. These base 
run model results can be found in Figure 6 below, which compares the base run results with the survey 
results.  
 
 
SR = Survey Results, BR = Base Run Results 
Figure 6: Comparison of base run and survey results of cropping systems cultivated 
 
Comparison Between Base-Run and Reality 
Under current endowments, all modeled types of farm households cultivate all their irrigated land 
available with soybean-irrigated rice with high inputs if water is only available during the summer season. 
If water is available in both the spring and the summer season, two cycles of irrigated rice with high inputs 
will be cultivated. In reality however, as can be seen from the survey results of cropping systems 
cultivated presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 under the columns “SR”, farmers who only have access to 
water during the summer season will leave the land fallow during spring and cultivate rice on it in the 
summer season. Soybean cultivation on irrigated rice fields is a new cropping system promoted by local 
authorities. The low rate of adoption of the cropping system by farm households can be due to three 
reasons; Firstly, risk averse farmers may be reluctant in adopting new cropping systems; the absence of 
risk considerations in the model may not take this into account. Secondly, the market chain for alternative 
crops is not yet as developed as that of rice. Thirdly, livestock is allowed to walk freely during the spring 
season. In order to overcome livestock destroying crops, farm households are reluctant on cultivating 
spring crops in lowland areas. Simple measurements such as fencing could however prevent this. 
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Some differences in cropping systems cultivated on the slopes between the base run scenario of the 
model and the survey results in reality can be analyzed when comparing SR (survey results) and BR 
(base run results) in Figure 6 above. The survey results show a larger adoption of the short rotation cycle 
upland rice-cassava-fallow for the poor farm households, especially for the household type water scarce, 
land rich. Comparison of the results also indicates an adoption of cassava by the richer farm households, 
which is left out in the base run. The difference in the amount of cassava cultivation identified in the short 
rotation system and the adoption of cassava can be explained by the fact that livestock is not taken into 
account in the model. Cassava is one of the main feeds for livestock (together with maize) and therefore 
necessary to be cultivated by farmers in reality. The two poorest groups of farm households are forced to 
mainly use the rotation systems on the slopes because of their insufficiency in rice caused by their very 
low endowments in irrigated lowlands. Only farm households with sufficient area of irrigated lowland 
seem to relieve pressure on the sloping areas, but this is mainly due to the labor shortages that they face 
during critical periods of upland crop cultivation (establishment of summer crops in the sloping 
compartment). 
 
As explained before, perennials are highly dependent on altitude and climate characteristics and 
therefore, farmers in the different villages studied will cultivate those perennials that are suitable to their 
environments. For this reason, we aggregated the different perennials cultivated in Figure 5 and 6 
representing survey results. The base run result of the model do however show that the cultivation of tea, 
where possible, would bring the highest revenue. 
 
When comparing farmers land endowments with the survey and base run results, we can conclude that 
for all types of farm households, all land in possession is either cultivated or left fallow as part of rotation 
systems. Hence, cultivation in the lowlands does not seem to diminish cultivation in the uplands. This 
means that the labor constraint of most farmers in the area is, due to the very high land constraints, not 
high. 
 
Revenue Distribution Between Farm Households 
From table 2 below it can be seen that, based on the discretionary income, total revenues per farm 
household type in the base run are very unevenly distributed between different farm types. In the base 
run scenario, the farm household groups “Water and Land Scarce” and “Water Scarce, Land Rich” live 
below the one USD per day poverty line and are therefore identified as the two poorest farm household 
groups. 
 
Table 2: Simulated total revenues per farm household type 
  
Water and 
Land 
Scarce 
Water 
Scarce, 
Land Rich 
Off-Farm 
Work 
Terrace and 
Uplanders 
Terrace 
and 
Perennials 
Paddy 
Rich 
Ranking in revenue 
per head a) 1 2 3 6 5 4 
Total Revenue (incl. 
home consumption) 
(USD/head/day) 
0.49 0.79 1 2.77 1.15 1.13 
1USD = 19000 VND 
a)
 Where 1 represents the poorest farm household and 6 the richest farm household 
26 
 
7. Alternative scenarios 
 
Introduction 
In the different simulations, where some sloping land is set aside for re-forestation projects in order to 
restore the watershed function, land available for upland farming is reduced. In parallel, we assumed that 
water access for irrigation was improved in the lower part of the catchment. Different alternative scenarios 
on how land could be set aside (from whom and what share of land set-aside for each farm type) and how 
the additional available water would be shared were developed. In terms of additional water allocation, we 
made a distinction between water availability during only the summer or during the spring and summer 
season and whether this additional availability would occur on terrace or paddy land. With these different 
simulations, we aim to provide more insight in the trade-offs involved in the resource use between 
different parts of the catchment for different groups of farmers. In order to restore the watershed functions, 
land available for upland farming is reduced, which means that the ‘sloping’ area for each modeled farm 
is scaled down.  
 
Reforestation and watershed improvement 
There are two reasons behind making more water available: Firstly, although still under scientific debate, 
an increased area of forest in the upper compartment of the catchment has the potential to change the 
water flows which would make more water available for irrigation in the lower compartments. There is 
however quite some scientific debate on the direct relationship between reforestation and watershed 
improvement. Forest restoration upstream may have a net positive or negative impact on water provision 
in both better water quality and greater quantity downstream (Koysoy et al. 2006). There are even 
opposite PES schemes investigated in South Africa that levied a charge on commercial forestation areas, 
aimed at giving a compensation for the capture of water by new trees (Katilla and Puustjarvi, 2004). This 
would imply a tradeoff between the improvement of water availability and biodiversity protection. There is 
however more consensus on the relationship between forest cover and water quality. It is namely 
generally approved that a reforestation will lead to less erosion, lower sedimentation rates and more 
nutrient and chemical outflows as leaching rises (Ayward, 2005). 
 
Secondly, some new infrastructure works can be built that increase the amount of water available for the 
community. Namely, there is more water available in the study area than is currently used; the main 
constraint is that farmers cannot fetch the water. Irrigation infrastructures can overcome this problem. 
These infrastructures could be interpreted as a compensation for the land set-aside in order to restore 
watershed ecosystem functions and as an incentive from policies for farmers to do so. Depending on the 
watershed configuration and institutions, different scenarios of water increasing availability can be thought 
of. 
 
Different scenarios explained 
In order to fully measure the trade-offs, we modeled a hypothetical village of 112 households, in which the 
six types of households are in strict proportion to the data gathered in the typology. We simulated that 10 
hectare or 8% of sloping land is to be set aside for forest re-growth, based on the assumption that this 
would be the maximum amount of sloping land that farm households would be able to set aside. In table 3 
three mechanisms to set-aside this 10 ha of land among different types of farm households are calculated: 
first by converting 8% of each household’s sloping land; secondly, by converting 870 m2 of sloping land 
from each farm household; lastly, by setting-aside 1650 m2 of sloping land only from farm households 
belonging to the two richest types. With these three different set-aside schemes, we aim to measure the 
losses in terms of revenues and food self-sufficiency that different types of farm households have to 
overcome and what the impacts in terms of revenue of these losses would be for the village as a whole.  
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At the same time, we analyzed the benefits of additional water access for different types of households 
and the village as a whole caused by the set-aside of land by investigating four exclusive scenarios based 
on how much water can be made available and how this is used. In the first scenario, we did not built new 
terraces, but assumed that the 10 ha of sloping land that is set aside will make additional water in 2 
hectare of lowland available, which is allocated by converting 12% of each farm household’s existing 
endowment in paddy/terrace land with only summer irrigation to spring and summer irrigation.  
 
In the following three scenario’s, we increase the amount of terraces with water available during the 
summer. In the first scenario, we allocated 180m2 of terrace land with summer irrigation to each 
household. Secondly, we allocated 150m2 of terrace land with spring and summer irrigation to each 
household. The difference in size between these two scenarios follows from the reasoning that it is more 
difficult to fetch water during the spring season than during the summer season. Lastly, we assigned 
300m2 of terraces with spring and summer irrigation to the households belonging to the two poorest types. 
We assumed a direct relationship between reforestation and watershed improvement under the scenarios 
where the set-aside of upland is compensated by terrace land. These scenarios are represented in table 
3 below. 
 
Table 3: Different trade-off scenarios 
 
Water 
and 
Land 
Scarce 
Water 
Scarce,  
Land 
Rich 
Off-
Farm  
Work 
Terrace 
and 
Perennials 
Terrace 
and 
Uplanders 
Paddy 
Rich 
Total 
(ha) 
No. Farmers 37 16 7 16 14 22  
Sloping area (m2) 6500 14000 7800 8000 16000 15000 122 
Set aside of sloping land (m2) 
Equal proportion (8% each) 520 1120 624 640 1280 1200 10 
Equal area 866 866 866 866 866 866 10 
Equal area (richest) 0 0 1645 1645 1645 1645 10 
Additional water in the lowland (m2) 
      
Convert 12% of terraces a) 24 60  252 360  1.1 
Convert 12% of paddy a)   180   360 0.9 
Total Converted       2 
Add equal area terraces b) 180 180 180 180 180 180 2 
Add equal area paddy c) 150 150 150 150 150 150 1.6 
Add equal area terraces c) 300 300 0 0 0 0 1.6 
a)
 Convert summer irrigation to spring and summer irrigation 
b) Add area with summer irrigation 
c)
 Add area with spring and summer irrigation 
 
The three types of sloping land set-aside, and four types of allocation of the newly developed irrigable 
land lead us to 12 alternative scenarios as represented in table 4. We used exclusive scenario’s that 
analyzed the impact of different water improvement schemes, where some of them are based on a 
natural improvement in water availability and some are not. 
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Table 4: Overview of 12 alternative scenarios 
Additional water in lowlands Set aside 8%  
from all 
Set aside 870 m2 
from all 
Set Aside 1650 m2  
from rich 
Convert 12% paddy/terraces a) S01 S05 S09 
Add 180m2 to all b) S02 S06 S10 
Add 150m2 to all c) S03 S07 S11 
Add 300m2 to poorest c) S04 S08 S12 
a)
 Convert summer irrigation to spring and summer irrigation 
b) Add area with summer irrigation 
c) Add area with spring and summer irrigation 
 
The following chapter will first examine the change in discretionary income due to different land set-aside 
schemes if no compensation would be given and thereafter the impacts on the different land set-aside 
and water addition schemes on the discretionary income from an individual, farm household and village 
perspective. From this, we will draw implications for the possible effects of wealth distribution on different 
types of farm households and the village as a whole.  
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8. Land set-aside and more water in the bottom valleys  
 
Impact of Land Set-Aside on Revenues 
Table 5 below shows that if farmers would be forced to set-aside upland areas without receiving 
compensation of any kind, this would obviously have a negative impact on the discretionary income of all 
farm household types involved; however, in a very diversified way. The poorest household group, Water 
and Land Scarce would be by far affected worst. With almost no irrigated lowland available and a very 
low endowment in sloping land, an equal area set aside would lead to a 20% total revenue loss for this 
type of farm household. While this is by far the largest influence, there is a need for every farm household 
to be compensated for their loss. 
 
Table 5: Change in discretionary income due to different land set-aside schemes without compensation in 1000 VND 
 
Water 
and 
Land 
Scarce 
Water  
Scarce, 
Land 
Rich 
Off-
Farm  
Work 
Terraces  
and 
Uplanders 
Terraces  
and 
Perennials 
Paddy 
Rich 
Village 
Total 
8% land set-aside -1337 -666 -596 -832 -611 -945 -106511 
 (-9.9%) (-2.4%) (-1.2%) (-1.7%) (-1.2%) (-2.0%) (-4.5%) 
870 m2 land set- -2711 -504 -830 -565 -830 -684 -150419 
aside (-20.1%) (-1.9%) (-1.7%) (-1.2%) (-1.6%) (-1.4%) (-7.7%) 
1650 m2 land set- - - -1576 -1117 -1734 -1299 -82992 
aside - - (-3.2%) (-2.3%) (-3.4%) (-2.7%) (-2.9%) 
 
Impact of the different scenarios 
Table 6 below shows the percentage change of each of the trade-off schemes on the discretionary 
income of the individual farmer (weighting the impact on households by the number of persons in the 
household), the different types of farm households and the village as a whole (weighted sum of the 
impact on each household type). As can be seen from the table, the trade-off schemes have a small 
impact on average total village revenues, ranging between a negative relative change of 3.3% and a 
positive relative change of 8.6%. The reason for these small changes is thus not because farm-household 
objectives are almost unaffected by a land set-aside, but because water addition schemes seem to be a 
good strategy to compensate farmers from revenue loss incurred by land set-aside. As was represented 
in table 5, poor households seem to be affected worst by a possible land set-aside; with the lowest 
amount of land endowments, a change in land allocation is likely to have the highest impact on this type 
of farm households. However, with one of the objectives being food self-sufficiency and a preference for 
rice, these food self-insufficient households are also the most benefited by a lowland compensation. 
Therefore, positive and negative impacts will change most for this type of households, ranging between a 
negative impact of 8.5% and a positive impact of 27.5%.  
 
The only losses in discretionary income for the village as a whole can be found under scenario S01 (8% 
land set-aside combined with irrigated lowland conversion) and S05 (870m2 land set-aside combined with 
irrigated lowland conversion). Here, additional  production in irrigable land does not compensate for the 
loss of land in the sloping compartment. The reason for this is that the compensation schemes in the form 
of 12 percent converted irrigated lowland are not beneficial to the poorest household groups, Water and 
Land Scarce and Water Scarce, Land Rich, since they have a very low possession in irrigated lowland. 
As can be derived from table 3, the poorest group of farm households composes 33% of the households 
in the village and the two poorest groups together close to 50%. Hence, a positive change in the 
discretionary income of these two groups will put a relatively high weight on the likelihood for a positive 
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village discretionary income change. This shows that insufficient compensation for the set-aside of land of 
these household types can have some dramatic effects in terms of discretionary income. The largest 
positive changes in discretionary income for the two poorest groups of farmers can be found under S04, 
S08 and S12, where new terraces are only appointed to the two poorest types of farm households. An 
increase in irrigated lowland for these types of households is likely to have a major impact on the rice self-
sufficiency among these groups of farmers. 
 
Individual financial rewards for setting aside some sloping land are not likely to be viable for the poorest 
groups of farm households because of their goal of food self-sufficiency combined with the market failures 
that the households face. These results are complementary to earlier simulations made on poor farmers 
with very low access to markets (Jourdain, 2009). The analysis leads us to conclude that the allocation of 
new irrigable land could potentially be attractive from a social and private point of view, because poor 
farm households will relatively benefit more from the construction of new terrace land. Therefore, the most 
attractive scenario’s for the majority of the village are those that lead to a large increase of farm revenue 
for the poorest households, and a small decrease for the richest households, such as S02, S03, S04, S08, 
S10, S11 and S12. In all of these scenarios, poor farmers do not have to set-aside a large amount of 
upland (8% or only set-aside of land for the rich households) but do get compensated by the construction 
of new terrace land. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
The analysis of the twelve alternative scenarios leads us to conclude that a reduction of cropped area, 
associated with small increases in irrigable land in the lower compartment, has some potential beneficial 
effects in terms of distribution of revenues among households of a community, without having a major 
impact on the aggregate village revenues. In certain scenarios, this can lead to an improvement in the 
revenues of poor farmers, while not affecting much of the revenues of better endowed farmers. 
Coordination at the village or commune level and a deliberative choice to help the poorly endowed 
households is however essential in order to achieve a distribution that has the support of and is beneficial 
to most of the households in the village and the poorly endowed households in particular. This is 
especially of large importance in the light of the re-allocation of land after the transition from the collective 
to the market system, which showed that a very uneven distribution of land could emerge from village 
decisions. 
 
This type of scheme, where sloping land is set-aside and small quantities of irrigable land are being 
distributed seems to work well for the farmers in the upland of Vietnam. Namely, because of the market 
failures and the combined objective of maximization their discretionary income and food self-sufficiency, 
households have the preference for, and no other option than, intensifying in cropping activities if they 
want to increase their objectives. However, the constraints that the farm households face have to allow 
them to do so and as identified in the base run, the most stringent one is the constraint in land 
endowments. Hence, compensating farmers by loosening the most stringent constraint that they face, will 
most likely attribute to an increase in their discretionary income and a higher rice production. However, as 
is clear from the analysis on the different scenarios, the cut-off point between setting aside upland area 
and additional irrigation water is highly dependent on the farm household type. So far, we have examined 
the effects of imposing different ratios of setting aside upland area for more irrigation water. However, if 
we want to find base for the implementation of these kind of scenarios, farmers have to be willing to 
voluntarily set-aside sloping land. Therefore, we will analyze the cut-off points between setting aside 
sloping land and making more irrigation water available in the lowland compartments for each farm 
household type in the next sections. We will do so with the help of the theory of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) that is explained in the following chapter. 
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Table 6: Percentage change in discretionary income due to different land set-aside and compensation  schemes 
Total Revenue Change 
Per Farm Household Group 
(%) 
S01 S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10 S11 S12 
Water and Land Scarce -1.96 12.51 15.94 24.12 -8.45 10.05 13.48 21.65 4.49 16.19 19.41 27.52 
Water Scarce, Land Rich -1.63 0.1 1.53 5.19 -1.11 0.63 2.06 5.72 0.73 2.36 3.81 7.38 
Off-Farm Work -0.78 -0.41 -0.18 -1.22 -1.26 -0.89 -0.66 -1.7 -2.79 -2.42 -2.19 -3.23 
Terraces and Uplanders -0.88 -1.15 -0.89 -1.74 -0.32 -0.59 -0.33 -1.18 -1.47 -1.69 -1.44 -2.33 
Terraces and Perennials -0.6 -0.48 -0.23 -1.2 -1.03 -0.91 -0.66 -1.63 -2.83 -2.64 -2.41 -3.41 
Paddy Rich -1.13 -1.35 -1.09 -1.99 -0.58 -0.79 -0.54 -1.44 -1.87 -2.09 -1.84 -2.74 
Total Revenue Changes For the Village (%) 
Village -1.35 3.68 5.12 7.85 -3.33 3 4.46 7.2 0.46 4.54 5.93 8.63 
Average Revenue Changes 
Per Head (%) -6.77 13.64 19.86 30.02 -14.61 10.93 17.36 27.51 -1.31 15.27 21.41 31.35 
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9. Defining Payment for Environmental Services Schemes 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will analyze the Theory of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) and apply it to 
our case. The aim of the PES-like scheme that we try to develop here, is to find base for farmers to 
voluntarily set-aside their sloping land instead of imposing schemes as we did in the chapter before. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Although Payments for Environmental Services (PES) is a fairly new concept, the theoretical foundations 
have been set decades ago by Coase (1960). Coase’s theorem states that in markets where transaction 
costs do not occur, efficiency gains due to the internalization of environmental externalities will lead to 
efficient outcomes whatever the direction of the payment and the initial endowment of property rights may 
be. Hence, according to Coase the polluter does not always have to pay for the inconvenience caused by 
him. Therefore, the polluter pays principle, where the economic agents who cause damage to the natural 
environment are the ones who have to pay for it, would according to Coase’s theorem not be a condition 
to achieve a Pareto better situation in a PES application (Kosoy et al. 2006). Classical in understanding 
Coase’s way of thinking is the example of the steam engine; if a steam engine is causing harm to the 
cereal fields next to the railway, then less steam engines should be on the railway as long as the marginal 
harm done to the production of cereal is greater than the marginal revenues from the steam engine. 
According to Coase, this does not mean that the railway company is responsible for all harm done to 
cereal production. Payments from the railway company are likely to lead the cereal farmers to produce 
more cereal, because for every kilo of cereal produced they will get the full market price. This could mean 
the bankruptcy of the railway company and will definitely not secure an optimal allocation. According to 
Coase, as long as property rights are clearly established, polluters and those who are damaged by their 
actions will enter a negotiation that leads to financial compensation that guarantees a Pareto optimal 
situation. This is however under the precondition that negotiations can take place without costs. However, 
in real life situations, transaction costs of these negotiations are likely to run high, which will make 
property rights important in the negotiations and will not lead to a Pareto optimal situation anymore (Dietz 
et al., 2004). 
 
PES is based on the principles behind the internalization of environmental externalities of Coase. Wunder 
(2005) defines PES as “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental service (ES) or a land 
use likely to secure that service is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer from a (minimum one) 
service provider if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality)”. This 
definition entails the five criteria of Wunder (2005) for a PES-scheme: 1. a voluntary transaction, 2. a well-
defined environmental service, 3. bought by a (minimum one) ES buyer, 4. bought from a (minimum one) 
ES provider, 5. conditionality is secured. The ‘environmental services’ mentioned in this definition are the 
positive externalities that natural or human-managed ecosystems entail and which are normally not taken 
into account in individual economic decision-making (Kosoy et al. 2006). Programs according to these 
criteria have been applied increasingly in both developed and developing countries as one of the 
solutions to combat losing or reducing valuable environmental services in ecosystems. These PES 
programs can be seen as contributing in a new way to the supply side in directly ‘buying conservation’ 
(Wunder et al., 2008). 
 
Goals of PES-schemes 
The core idea behind PES is that people with access to land in certain local areas adopt practices that 
guarantee the conservation or restoration of ecosystems, for which they get direct contractual and 
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conditional payments from external ES beneficiaries in return (Wunder, 2005). Based on their studies of 
payments for water-related environmental services in Central America, Kosoy et al. (2006) found that the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation are generally larger than the payments received.   
 
An often mentioned second goal of PES-schemes is poverty reduction and welfare equalization. However, 
there may be quite some reasons that could lead a potential poverty reducing PES scheme to result in a 
welfare reducing strategy, as described by Wunder (2005).  Unsecure property rights may for example 
lead powerful groups to drive poor households away because previously marginalized land now got a 
higher value. Moreover, PES schemes are likely to have a positive impact on those who participate, but a 
negative impact on those who are unable to participate or on the poor consumers. It has also been shown 
that PES can have a negative impact on farmers with small land endowments and a heavy focus towards 
agriculture. Furthermore, poverty reduction will not be met if the PES schemes do not cover the 
opportunity costs of the land-use adjustments. Lastly, there are quite some reasons for the exclusion of 
targeted producers for reasons as land tenure, lack of endowments or access to credit. 
 
PES-schemes in Vietnam 
The practical implementation of PES schemes has only started recently, but there are quite a lot of PES-
like schemes already implemented. PES-like schemes are those schemes that share some main 
characteristics of the PES program but do not fulfill all five criteria. In Northern Vietnam, there are 
currently no PES schemes implemented in the upper catchments, while there are quite some PES-like 
projects implemented in Central and South Vietnam. However, the Vietnamese government has recently 
shown interest in applying PES schemes in Northern Vietnam, which is characterized by the 
establishment of the Fund for the Protection and Development of Forestry that organizes payment fees by 
downstream users of watershed services to finance forestry projects in the upper-catchments (Jourdain et 
al., 2009). In line with this fund, the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 
conducted a pilot policy for Payment for Forest Environmental Services in two provinces in Northern 
Vietnam. The main aim of this project was to “stabilize the livelihoods of forest dependent local people in 
the above watersheds”, with the specific target group of the over 100.000 people that had to resettle for 
the hydro-power plant in Son La province. In order to meet this aim, the fund focused on improving 
watershed services from a forest sector perspective. Under the program, inhabitants with ownership or 
traditional access to the land get paid for providing forest protection that will in turn help environmental 
and eco-system protection. This program found its base in the same problem as faced in our study area; 
the negative environmental impacts created by upland agriculture. Inhabitants setting aside forest land 
will receive an annual payment of 300,000 VND (around 15.40 USD) per ha/year. The program does 
however recognize that this would by far not be enough to compensate the opportunity costs of for 
example not being able to cultivate maize on these slopes; which is estimated at 24 million VND (around 
1233 USD) per hectare (Government of Vietnam, 2008).  
 
Application to the study area 
The Fund for the protection and Development of Forestry thus aims at providing monetary incentives for 
farmers to set-aside their farm land for reforestation in order to improve watershed functions, reforestation 
and eventually overall biodiversity (Government of Vietnam, 2008). As has been pointed out, water is 
however also a scarce resource for the farmers that possess uplands in our study site. Moreover, 
reforestation alone is not likely to guarantee watershed improvement. Therefore, we introduce a PES-like 
program that accommodates collective water infrastructures as payment for setting aside upland for forest 
restoration by farmers. As mentioned in the study area, the farmers do not construct new terraces 
because they are not able to fetch the water. An improvement in water infrastructures would lead farmers 
to get better access to the water and overcome their loss of uplands by getting more lowland area 
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available. In this way, the opportunity costs of setting aside upland can be compensated by more 
cultivation in the lowlands. Instead of developing different set-aside schemes to find out which one would 
fit best into the context of our study area as we did in the first part, we now want to assess for what 
amount of water addition in the lowlands farm households will voluntarily choose to set-aside upland 
areas according to the two different set-aside schemes of the previous section; (1) 8% of the land of all 
farm households, (2) 870m2 of all households. The third set-aside scheme investigated in the previous 
section, 1650m2 only for the rich households is left out because this scheme would exclude the 
participation of poor households in the PES-scheme. 
 
Targets 
With the help of table 7 below, the main features of the proposed PES-like scheme can be explained. As 
has been shown in the sections before, especially the two poorest types of farm households have 
problems meeting their short-term livelihood needs, and therefore use long rotation cycles with short 
fallow periods on their uplands, an agricultural practice that is unsustainable in the long term. Converting 
this land to forestry systems will provide a service that would lead to watershed protection, biodiversity 
conservation and carbon storage (Jourdain et al., 2009). The main goal of our proposed PES-like 
program, watershed protection in order to adopt land uses that improve reforestation and are likely to limit 
soil erosion in the uplands and serve a better biodiversity protection are two of the four main types of ES, 
the others being carbon sequestration and storage and landscape beauty (Wunder, 2005). In this way, 
the PES-like scheme can serve as an instrument that will in general improve the condition of the 
ecosystem services in place and more specifically the natural resources forests and water availability, 
while at the same time raising awareness to the sustainability of ecosystems and contributing to 
economic development.  
 
In the previous chapter we have shown that overall village impacts on the revenues of the different 
schemes are not large but that, with coordination at the village or commune level, certain schemes can 
lead to an improvement of welfare equalization and therefore poverty reduction of the poorest groups of 
farm households. This means that the second goal of PES schemes, poverty reduction and welfare 
equalization, has the potential to be met. 
 
Providers, Buyers and Intermediary 
In PES-schemes focused on watershed protection, regulation is often enforced by making downstream 
water users pay upstream farmers for adopting different land use practices (Wunder, 2005). Hence, the 
PES schemes then focus on creating a conditional benefit transfer between the Uplanders, which are the 
providers of environmental services in one village, and the downstream beneficiaries in another village 
(Jourdain et al., 2009). In Van Chan, all inhabitants of the village are farmers and despite in a much 
differentiated way, have both upland and lowland areas available. Our study area composes those 
farmers that are the providers of the environmental services, where the potential users of the various 
PES-like schemes are located in downstream catchments. Together, farmers can generate environmental 
benefits by facilitating upland-lowland interactions and at the same time improve their livelihoods. The 
downstream users of the program are the beneficiaries of the environmental service provided by the 
upstream farmers and will pay a tax for the water that they use. This tax will be transferred via the Fund 
for Protection and Development of Forestry to the providers of the environmental service, who will be 
compensated by the construction of irrigation schemes and additional terrace land. Hence, the 
downstream farmers will finance the construction of additional irrigated lowland and collective 
infrastructures, which is organized via de Fund for Protection and Development of Forestry. 
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Table 7: Main characteristics of the PES-like scheme (based on Wunder et al. (2005)). 
 
Case, 
Country 
Targeted Paid For Buyer Provider Initiator Spatial scale 
and current 
size 
Payment 
Method 
Obstacles to 
implementation 
 
 
Upland 
conversion of 
farm practice 
into 
reforestation 
in village of 
Van Chan 
district, Yen 
Bai province 
Watershed 
and  
biodiversity 
protection 
(possibly 
poverty 
reduction) 
Fund for the 
protection and 
development  
of forestry (water 
infrastructure) / 
inhabitants of 
downstream 
catchments 
(monetary 
payments) 
Inhabitants of 
downstream 
catchments via  
the Fund for 
the Protection 
and 
Development 
of Forestry 
Individual 
farm 
households 
upstream 
Govern
ment of 
Vietnam 
(MARD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upland set-
Aside:  
1. 8% from all 
2. 869 m2 
from all 
 
 
 
 
1. More water 
available on 
existing terrace / 
paddy land 
2. Construction 
of new terrace 
land 
Reallocation of 
land 
Monitoring costs 
Transaction costs 
Conditionality 
enforcement 
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Payment Method 
Currently, farmers in downstream catchments do not pay for the water that they receive. However, their 
organization of irrigated lowland, with paddy and terrace land managed in blocks of around six families as 
explained in Chapter 2, does allow payment schemes to be set-up. The proposed PES-like scheme does 
not only contribute but also adds to the existing PES literature in two ways; Firstly, it provides an unique 
mix in the analysis of communal and private payments that will give an incentive for farmers to not only 
provide ES but also cultivate in a more sustainable way. Namely, if farmers would only get additional 
payments, they are likely to practice even more intensive cultivation on the land that they have. With 
additional lowland, their consumer demands can be more easily met by production decisions. Secondly, 
because the reward for the trade-off between forest and better irrigation is partly additional irrigation water 
from a public scheme, it will not be negotiated with individuals but with communities. Inhabitants of the 
village together have to decide how to improve and allocate access to water. This type of PES-like 
scheme would be defined as an area-based PES scheme that stipulates how the areas of land will be 
converted. Furthermore, the PES-like scheme is use-restricting in the sense that it rewards providers for 
fully setting aside upland areas (Wunder, 2005). For the payments by converting existing terrace / paddy 
land, rewards will be defined in a negotiation between the governmental fund and the local communities 
of farm households. For the payments in the construction of new terrace land, resource flows will happen 
between individual farm households who individually decide to engage in the PES-like scheme. 
 
Application to PES-Criteria 
We can apply the five criteria of Wunder’s (2005) definition to our proposed PES-program in the following 
way: 
1. Voluntary transaction. A main prerequisite for a PES scheme is that it is voluntary instead of 
using a command and control framework. The previous section showed by looking at the revenue 
impacts for differentiated households and the village as a whole that there is a potential interest to 
set-aside upland area in return for additional irrigation water. Imposing the quantities for both set-
aside and water addition, as we did in the previous section, does however imply a command and 
control system, a way in which payments in Vietnam have so far mainly been implemented 
(Wunder, 2005). These command-and-control systems are generally inflexible; they require high 
transaction, monitoring and enforcement costs. Moreover, they are likely to induce social conflict 
and non-compliance. Only by knowing that the PES-program will be voluntary, the assumption 
can be made that farmers that do participate will at least cover their opportunity costs of giving up 
their environmental damaging activity (Engel et al., 2008). Searching for the cut-off point where 
different types of farmers will abandon a certain amount of upland area for irrigated lowlands as 
we will do in the next chapter, will add a voluntary element to the transaction. However, according 
to our proposed scheme, the farmers still cannot decide on the amount of land they want to set 
aside. 
2. A well-defined environmental service. What is bought should be a directly measurable service. 
The service of setting aside sloping land is directly measurable by the forest area that will be 
created on this land which will lead to an overall reduction in land degradation and an 
improvement of the ecosystem functions such as watershed regulation services.  
 
3. The environmental service is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer. An ES can be either 
bought by the actual users of the ES or by others acting on behalf of the potential users. Our 
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PES-like program is operated through the government fund but it are the service users of the ES 
that pay the annual fee for service provision. This program stands in between a ‘user financed’ 
and a ‘government financed’ program because at least part of the program is directly financed by 
its users and we aim for collective design decisions between government and service providers 
on the one hand and government and service users on the other hand (Engel et al., 2008). Hence, 
the government acts as an intermediary by distributing payments from ES users of downstream 
catchments to ES providers in upstream catchments. As explained before, farmers get paid by 
more access to water due to (1) the construction of additional terrace/paddy land from areas 
where farmers currently cannot fetch the water and (2) the construction of new infrastructure 
works that are build and will increase the amount of water available for the community. The 
resource flow goes from the farmers in the downstream catchments (resource to be paid for: 
more access to water), via the Fund for the Protection and Development of Forestry that act as 
an intermediate (regulate transfers between service users and service providers, receive upland 
areas, give access to irrigated lowlands) to the farmers in the upstream areas (resource provided: 
land set-aside).  
4. The environmental service is ‘bought’ from a (minimum one) ES provider. The ES providers are 
thus the farmers currently cultivating the uplands in a non-sustainable way who adjust their 
farming practices in order to give space for forest restoration with the function of improving the 
ecosystems services. They are the landholders that can affect downstream water services in 
other catchments by adjusting their land-use practices. Here, the resource flow goes from the 
farmers in the upper catchments (resource set-aside: upland areas), regulated by the Fund for 
the Protection and Development of Forestry that act as an intermediate, to the farmers in the 
downstream catchments (resource obtained: additional access to water).  
5. ES is only bought if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality). The mode of payment 
to the provider of an ES service may be vital for the sustainability of the contract; hence, 
conditionality is essential. This is the reason why our proposed program is not a PES-program but 
a PES-like program. The irrigation infrastructures and construction of new terraces do yearly 
compensate for the set-aside of upland area, but are given once and therefore do not function as 
an incentive for farmers to provide ES anymore. With only these payments, flexible contracts in 
which farmers can decide to pull out with for example changing context conditions cannot be 
granted. We will explain some alternative mechanisms to overcome this conditionality problem 
that can be thought of. However, none of these seem to suit the local environment or work 
according to rational economic theory.   
Possible ways to Enforce Conditionality 
In most PES-programs, environmental services are being paid in cash, but providers of ES have in 
certain cases also been compensated by technical assistance (TA), agricultural labor, input costs or in-
kind compensation such as provision of seedlings in reforestation programs (Wunder et al., 2008). While 
cash may be the most flexible form of payments to ES providers, it also received the critique from 
development practioners that cash is not likely to create sustained local welfare (Wunder, 2005). 
Increased irrigation water is a quite unique payment for PES schemes and because of the infrastructure 
development that such payment requires, it may be easily confused with Integrated Conservation 
Development Projects (ICDP’s). ICDP’s provide alternatives to environmentally damaging activities, but in 
reality often act as complements instead of substitutes and therefore fail to deliver the desired ES (Engel 
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et al., 2008). Like the program that we propose, they are also focused on biodiversity conservation and 
seek to address the social and economic needs of communities who would else threaten biodiversity. It 
often involves large infrastructure works that are implemented up-front and therefore only induce short-
term conditionality (Hughes, Flintan; 2001).  
Contingent transfers of infrastructure such as buildings or roads thus have the negative side effect that 
once established, they do not create an economic incentive for a continuous supply of ES over time 
(Wunder, 2005). Our proposed program does however differ substantially from these projects in the fact 
that it aims at both collective (infrastructure works) and private (additional terrace land) payments. This 
kind of PES-like scheme will act as a substitute for setting aside land and will not be complementary to 
other payments given. However, that also means that conditionality is not enforced. Possible ways to 
enforce conditionality in our PES-like scheme include a combination of monetary payments with 
additional irrigation water and management of additional terrace land in the form of ‘lease contracts’ 
regulated by the governmental fund.  
 
Additional irrigation water in combination with monetary payments would not only include a payment that 
is given once, but also yearly compensation in the form of monetary payments and thus induce a 
continuous incentive to set aside upland area. However, because the additional irrigation and the 
monetary payments together are equal to the opportunity costs of setting aside sloping land, the annual 
monetary payments alone won’t be enough to compensate for the opportunity costs that the farmers face 
every year. Economically, this would still mean that the opportunity costs of setting aside upland are not 
fully compensated on a yearly basis, which would lead farmers to return to the uplands after payment on 
additional irrigation is provided. It may be that an improved social capital could bring social control 
between farm households that will make non-compliance less likely. Furthermore, possible social control 
is likely to reduce monitoring costs since farm households themselves monitor each other’s activities. 
 
Other possible schemes to enforce conditionality are lease contracts for the additional terrace land 
provided that will exclude farmers from cultivating the terrace land in case of non-compliance. However, 
the irrigation systems are locally managed and organized by farmers and highly context dependent. 
Farmers are organized in ‘blocks’ of around six families in which they collectively manage access to water 
to their fields and the maintenance of collective irrigation systems (Vidal, 2009). Lease contracts and 
possible exclusion from cultivating appointed terrace land will therefore overthrow the whole social 
organization within the villages and is therefore not a possible way to enforce conditionality. 
 
Theoretical Advantages and Disadvantages of the PES-like program 
The large advantage of our proposed PES-like program is that partly because all villagers are qualified to 
participate in the PES-like program and partly because the resource flows are communicated on a 
community level, there are no villagers who are excluded from participation, but affected by the PES-like 
scheme. From an efficiency point of view, PES would only pay those farmers who currently pose a threat 
to the ecosystems for adjusting their farming practices to provide ES (Wunder, 2005). Those who do not 
pose a threat do not get paid because this would not create any additionality (clearly visible adjustment in 
practices and net positive difference in biodiversity conservation). This in some way unfair mechanism 
does not apply to the PES scheme proposed by us. Since all farmers engage in both upland and lowland 
cultivation, they are all potential ES providers.  
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A distinction can often be made between those ES that are public goods and those that are not. In our 
PES program, both are present; the additional access to water that is made available by collective 
infrastructures is a public good that cannot prevent users from benefiting from the payment provided 
(non-excludability). The other aspects of the program; allocating additional terrace land, does however 
happen on an individual basis. Therefore, the resource flow in this latter aspect is on an individual farm 
household basis and therefore, free-riding does not occur here. For the beneficiaries in downstream 
catchments, water services are club goods; only the farmers that hold water rights or are located in a well-
defined watershed benefit from the ES and thus have to pay taxes (Engel et al., 2008). 
 
Economically speaking, it would be logical behavior that once farmers know that the PES-like scheme will 
be implemented, they will start to further deplete upland areas in order to gain more compensation. In our 
case this will not work for two reasons; (1) almost all of the accessible upland areas are currently used, (2) 
despite the fact that upland areas are not legally appointed to households, ownership of a certain piece of 
land is a common understanding among inhabitants. Social control among village members is therefore 
likely to prevent farm households of acquiring new upland just before the start of the PES-like program.  
 
As has been shown in the base scenario, the most intensive cultivators of upland areas are the most 
vulnerable groups where, due to their cultivation practice, land is usually less productive and more likely 
to suffer from erosion. Hence, they are the most important providers of environmental services since their 
farm practices are most harmful for biodiversity. Moreover, because all types of farm households are 
potential ES-providers and negotiation happens on a community level, the PES has the potential to 
contribute to a better wealth distribution and thereby poverty alleviation of the poorest types of farm 
households. The importance of involving the community in the proposed PES system is likely to increase 
the social capital, i.e. the networks, norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation among 
groups, by improving the internal organization. Lastly, by negotiating collectively over the PES-like 
schemes, the equilibrium in the inherent conflict between buyers trying to maximize their consumer 
surplus (setting aside as much upland as possible) and providers maximizing their producer surplus 
(receiving as much irrigation water as possible) is found.  
 
It is likely that large transaction costs will be involved in our proposed PES-like program. The 
landholdings of farmers are small and therefore it will involve a large number of contracts to include all 
interested farm households. Especially the large differentiation in landholdings will make transaction costs 
run high. One of the fears of PES is that it will decouple conservation from development; it may attract 
power seeking agents and may erode culturally rooted conservation values (Wunder, 2005). Because all 
villagers are farmers largely cultivating for self-sufficiency, this first point is not very likely to happen in our 
case. The proposed PES scheme is however likely to change traditionally and culturally rooted 
agricultural practices, not only in the uplands but also in the lowlands, as will be explained in the next 
section. Moreover, the PES scheme is likely to result in different trade-offs for different types of farm-
households who are setting aside the same amount of upland area. This may result in negative social 
influences, which reinforces the importance of community negotiations over the PES program. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed with the help of existing theory on Payment for Environmental Services how the 
PES-like program can be applied to our case. Assuming that the inhabitants of the village are rationally 
behaving agents with the main objective of maximizing their income and securing food provision, the 
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GAMS model results in the next chapter will show where the economic gains obtained from the different 
compensation schemes (additional water allocation in the form of irrigation schemes and new terrace land) 
are equal to the value of the foregone economic benefits of setting aside sloping land for reforestation. 
We assume that the farmers will accept all payments that exceed the sum of the opportunity costs that 
they face, implementation costs they must undertake and transaction costs they bear. Hence, the 
payments offered to the ES providers must exceed the benefit that they would receive if they would not 
change their behavior, but must be lower than the value of the benefit to the users of the ES. Assuming 
that governments pay the costs for the plantation of trees, the opportunity costs of the set-aside of upland 
remains restricted to the opportunity costs of not being able to use this land. From an efficiency point of 
view (Wunder, 2005), we would want to compensate the farmers just enough to overcome the opportunity 
costs of their current farming practice activities.  
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10. Analysis of PES-like schemes 
 
Introduction 
With the help of the GAMS-model, we can find the cut-off point where farmers are indifferent between the 
proposed PES-like scheme and practice as usual. Any payments above this cut-off point will lead the 
rationally behaving farmer to decide to engage in the PES-like program. One disadvantage of the linear 
programming model is the fact that we cannot analyze the optimal amount of land that a specific type of 
farm household would like to set-aside. Therefore, we developed six scenarios where we examined the 
cut-off point for each type of farm household for each scenario. The payment scenarios are represented 
in table 8 below. 
 
Table 8: Overview of the six scenarios of the PES-like program. 
  
Set aside 8% 
from all 
Set aside 870 
m2 from all 
Convert paddy/terraces a) P01 P04 
Add ?? m2 terraces 
summer irrigation P02 P05 
Add ?? m2 terraces spring 
and summer irrigation 
 
P03 P06 
a)
 Convert summer irrigation to spring and summer irrigation 
 
Collectively Negotiated PES-like Scheme 
P01 and P04 represent the construction of collective water infrastructure works. The idea is that these 
scenarios will be collectively negotiated between the government and different types of farm households. 
However, different types of farm households will need different amounts of payments to overcome their 
opportunity costs of setting aside sloping land. Table 9 below presents an overview for the percentage 
and amount of terrace / paddy land that needs to be converted per type of farm household. For the farm 
households that are mostly endowed in terrace land, summer irrigation on terraces has been converted 
into spring and summer irrigation on terraces. These are the households “Water and Land Scarce”, 
“Water Scarce, Land Rich” and “Terrace and Uplanders”. Obviously, the other two households “Off-Farm 
Work” and “Paddy Rich” are mostly endowed in paddy land. Therefore, we converted a certain amount of 
paddy land with summer irrigation into paddy land with spring and summer irrigation for these households.  
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Table 9: Amount and percentage of land to be converted under PES-like scenarios in m2 
Payment in  
irrigated 
lowland 
Water  
and Land 
Scarce 
Water  
Scarce, 
Land Rich 
Off-Farm  
Work 
Terrace 
and 
Uplanders 
Terrace 
and 
Perennials 
Paddy 
Rich 
P01 18.60% 39.20% 32.90% 24.30% 24.10% 27.60% 
P01 37.2 196 493.5 729 506.1 828 
Per m2 set-
aside a) 0.07 0.18 0.79 0.57 0.79 0.69 
P04 30.85% 30.60% 45.80% 16.50% 24.80% 20.00% 
P04 61.7 153 687 495 520.8 600 
Per m2 set-
aside a) 0.07 0.18 0.79 0.57 0.60 0.69 
a) The m2 of irrigated lowland necessary to compensate one m2 of upland. 
 
As can be seen from the table, different types of farmers are faced with highly differentiated percentages 
and square meters of conversion necessary to overcome their opportunity costs for every m2 of upland 
that they set aside. The reason for the difference in opportunity costs is linked to the non-separability of 
the consumer and producer decisions. As explained in the theoretical framework on non-separability, 
farmers have to adjust consumption and production decisions to each other because of the market 
failures that they face. As can be found in the mathematical description in the annex, the GAMS model 
imposes a minimum of food consumption per member of the farm household, of which at least 45% 
needs to be fulfilled with the consumption of rice. If farmers cannot fulfill their food requirements with the 
consumption of rice and have to switch to the consumption of maize or cassava, a linear loss component 
to capture the preference for rice is imposed and will put a strong disutility on rice shortages faced by 
farmers. The two poorest types of farm households, ‘Water and Land Scarce’ and ‘Water Scarce, Land 
Rich’ are not able to meet their minimum food requirements by the consumption of rice, which leaves 
them with undesirable rice shortages. This means that their opportunity costs of setting aside upland area 
in return for more lowland area are very low. Hence, a small improvement in their rice consumption will 
lead to a relative large improvement of their utility function and therefore these types of farm households 
are willing to give up a relatively large amount of upland for a relatively small amount of additional 
irrigation. As can be seen from Figure 7 below, the low opportunity costs of setting aside upland area are 
largely linked to the fact whether or not self-sufficiency in rice is reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Food consumption under scenario P01 and P04 
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As can be seen from table 10 below, the smallest total area that needs to be converted with collective 
infrastructures occurs under scenario P04 with a fixed amount of land-set aside for all farm households 
that participate. Under the scenario where irrigation schemes will lead to a transformation of lowland 
irrigation in the summer season to lowland irrigation in the spring and summer season, the providers of 
ES and the users of the provided ES, together with the government acting as an intermediate, have to 
collectively decide on the level of upland that has to be set aside in order to receive payments in 
additional access to water. This because it is not possible to construct irrigation schemes that will regulate 
the water flow for each individual household, especially because of the local management structure of 
irrigated lowland in the study area. With a deliberate choice to help the poor farm households, the 
collective negotiations could lead to an agreement where the poor farm households have to set-aside less 
sloping land than the rich farm households.  
 
This scheme would be new in the sense that it is collectively regulated; the resource flows do not occur 
between individual households as is normally the case in PES-schemes, but between villages as a whole, 
with the governmental fund acting as an intermediary. This way of distribution would allow for a 
reallocation of land and a better wealth distribution among farm households in the village. However, if the 
scheme is collectively negotiated, it is likely that there are households who would not be willing to engage 
in the program, especially the rich households who do not benefit from different set-aside schemes for 
different types of farm households in favor of the poor households. This would imply a command and 
control framework for those farm households not willing to cooperate, which is in contrast with the 
requirement of PES that actions must be voluntarily. Therefore, we will now investigate the individual 
schemes based on the allocation of additional terrace land.  
 
Table 10: Aggregate payments in  of water converted per scenario in m2 
  
Water 
and Land 
Scarce 
Water 
Scarce, 
Land 
Rich 
Off-Farm 
Work 
Terrace 
and 
Perennials 
Terrace 
and 
Uplanders 
Paddy 
Rich 
Total area in 
m2 
N 37 16 7 14 16 22  
Proportion 
(%) 33 14 6 13 14 20   
P01 1376.4 3136 3454.5 10206 8097.6 18216 44486.5 
P04 2282.9 2448 4809 6930 8332.8 13200 38002.7 
 
PES-like Scheme Between Individual Farm Households 
The communal irrigation schemes are different from the other two payment mechanisms where a certain 
amount of terrace land is allocated to individual farm households. These schemes are captured under the 
scenarios P02, P03, P05 and P06 in table 11. Also here, the opportunity costs of setting aside upland 
areas are much differentiated. The poorest household group, Water and Land Scarce only requires 
between 0.03 and 0.11 m2 of lowland compensation per m2 of upland set-aside, depending on the amount 
of upland that is set-aside and on whether the compensation given is lowland with only summer irrigation 
or with spring and summer irrigation. The group Terrace and Uplanders are the ones that require the 
most lowland for every m2 of upland that they set-aside if the amount of land to be set-aside is fixed. If the 
land set-aside is 8% of the total land set-aside per farm household, the group Off-Farm work faces the 
highest opportunity costs per m2 of land to be set-aside.  
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In PES projects that aim for a resource flow between individual farm households, a uniform payment is 
given on the basis of which farmers could decide whether or not to participate in the program. The 
amount of payment would be higher than the opportunity costs as represented in table 11, because  of all 
costs next to the loss in cultivation that farmers need to incur  (for example changing social practices and 
working calendars). Under the scenarios with only summer irrigation (P02 and P05) the amount of 
payment could be set at 0.20 or 0.30, meaning that with 0.20 m2 of lowland irrigation for every m2 of 
upland that is set aside only the two poorest groups, Water and Land Scarce and Water Scarce, Land 
Rich will choose to engage in the PES-like program. If we would set this higher to 0.30, also the group 
Terrace and Perennials is likely to engage in the program.  Under the scenario where compensation is 
given in the form of spring and summer irrigation (P03 and P06), the payment could be set at 0.10 or 0.20. 
Under this scenario, 0.10 m2 for every m2 of lowland would include Water and Land Scarce and Water 
Scarce, Land Rich and 0.20 m2 would also include the group Terrace and Uplanders.  
 
Table 11: PES-like schemes with the construction of additional terraces in m2 
Payment in  
irrigated lowland 
Water  
and 
Land 
Scarce 
Water  
Scarce, 
Land Rich 
Off-Farm  
Work 
Terrace and 
Uplanders 
Terrace and 
Perennials Paddy Rich 
P02 32.5 172.3 272 568 316.6 597 
Per m2  
set-aside a) 0.06 0.15 0.44 0.89 0.25 0.50 
P03 16.2 89.9 175.2 312 189.5 341 
Per m2  
set-aside a) 0.031 0.08 0.28 0.49 0.15 0.28 
P05 57.6 130.5 378 376 326.5 426 
Per m2  
set-aside a) 0.11 0.12 0.61 0.59 0.26 0.36 
P06 29.8 65 244 209 195.7 243 
Per m2  
set-aside a) 0.06 0.06 0.39 0.33 0.15 0.20 
a) The m2  of irrigated lowland necessary to compensate one m2 of upland. 
 
Whether payments in terraces with only summer irrigation or terraces with spring and summer irrigation 
will occur is dependent on the water that can be made available in the village. If the possibility of terraces 
with spring and summer irrigation is restricted to certain areas within the catchment, it could be decided to 
combine payments with only summer irrigation and payments with spring and summer irrigation.  
 
The lower opportunity costs for the poorest groups of farm households, induced by the market 
imperfections and related aim for food self-sufficiency can lead the PES-like schemes to cause a wealth-
redistribution among different types of farm households. Namely, the poorest types of farm households, 
as the most intensive cultivators of the upland areas, will adapt more sustainable practices in the 
lowlands that more than overcome their opportunity costs. Therefore, they will be better-off in maximizing 
their objectives after the PES-like program is imposed. The richer farm households on the other hand, 
face much higher opportunity costs and will thus not engage in the PES-like program. In this way, the 
PES-like program will induce a status quo for the richer farm households, but improve the situation for the 
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poorest farm households and hence, improve the equalization of wealth among different types of farm 
households.  
 
Practical discussion on the PES-like schemes 
The large advantage of PES-programs is their quid pro quo way of handling conservation; only those who 
provide valuable ES are being compensated. However, it is only truly efficient if the conditions of 
voluntariness and conditionality are met. Therefore, we will here examine the possible success of our 
proposed PES-like program and in how far it could be seen as efficient.  
 
Criteria for Success 
The success of PES-programs depends on a number of criteria. First of all, potential service providers 
must enroll in the program. As examined in the previous section, those farmers for whom opportunity 
costs are more than covered are likely to participate in the PES-like program.  
 
Secondly, providers must comply with the terms of their contract and compliance must be monitored. This 
compliance could happen through for example site inspections. However, as monitoring in itself will not 
be enough to ensure compliance, sanctions in case of non-compliance are a necessary mechanism as 
well. Possible sanctions may be to cut payments for schemes that would combine payments and 
additional irrigation or to exclude people from cultivating the terraces in case of lease contracts. However, 
the first mechanism would not be in line with the economic theory of rational behaving agents, when the 
latter one would overthrow the existing social structure in the study area. Therefore, sanctions to ensure 
compliance are not covered in our PES-like program. 
Thirdly, the induced land-use changes must generate the desired ES. The PES-like program must result 
in a change in land use compared to what would have happened if the program would not be 
implemented. Continuous cultivation on the upland will cause increasing soil erosion and pose more 
pressure on the ecosystem services. However, whether setting aside sloping land will naturally lead to a 
water improvement in downstream areas is still under scientific debate. Therefore, it is essential to 
establish a baseline in order to assess this additionality of setting aside sloping land in our PES-like 
program. The base-run scenarios of this study would already give a clear picture of the ‘business-as-
usual’ counterfactual scenario. It would however also be necessary to assess the ex-ante amount and 
accessibility of irrigation water in both downstream and upstream areas. An important concept within the 
PES schemes related to additionality is leakage; a program can achieve high additionality in a project 
area, but this does not help that much if it causes environmental degradation in another area (Wunder; 
2005). In our case, almost all upland accessible to the farm households is currently cultivated. Therefore, 
it will not be likely that farmers will move to cultivate in other areas. 
 
Lastly, the desired ES must be provided on a long term basis. If it would be possible to invent a 
mechanism to overcome conditionality, it is likely that the PES-like program will secure provision on a 
long term basis. Namely, in the context of this study, compensating farmers for their set-aside of upland 
area by lowland area will be much more sustainable in the long term. Bearing the market imperfections in 
the study area in mind, it would be more difficult for farmers to build a sustainable way of living around 
monetary payments, especially with an imperfect long-term credit market. With the provision of irrigated 
lowland, farmers can transfer their practices of cultivation from the uplands to the lowlands and make use 
of their factor endowments in for example labor. With market failure and an increase in the abundance of 
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labor under monetary payments, farmers could decide to cultivate the sloping areas that they have left 
more intensively. This would imply another form of leakage. 
Efficiency 
According to Kosoy et al. (2006), there are two conditions for PES schemes which have to be fulfilled in 
order to be efficient: Firstly, the compensation to landholders that provide environmental services should 
be at least equal to the opportunity cost of the promoted land use. In this chapter, we examined the cut-
off point where the opportunity costs of setting aside sloping land would be exactly compensated. In the 
schemes for payment by terrace land, farmers will only accept a certain amount of irrigated lowland for 
the set-aside of sloping land if it would be beneficial for their objective function of maximizing 
discretionary income and reaching food self-sufficiency; i.e. at least compensate their opportunity costs. 
This is however not the case in the communal scheme where farmers collectively have to set-aside land 
and make water available. This means that some rich farmers face higher opportunity costs for the set-
aside of sloping land and are therefore not willing to do so. However, because of the communal way of 
negotiating, this will lead to a situation where the majority of the farmers (especially the poor) will be much 
better off against a minority (rich households) who will experience small losses. Secondly, the amount of 
the payment should be lower than the economic value of the environmental externality. The economic 
value of the ES provided can only be determined once the PES-like program is in place, given an 
appropriate baseline. 
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11. Conclusion and discussion 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis explored how farmers in the upper-catchments of Northern Vietnam could relieve the pressure 
posed on the ecosystem services available by relieving the pressure on cultivating sloping land. Following 
the existing theory on market imperfections and non-separability, we showed that the market failures that 
exist in the study area lead farmers to not be able to separate consumption and production decisions 
anymore. Because of the market imperfections that occur in the labor, land and product markets and 
because farmers are not able to smoothen income between years, they do not just act as pure profit 
maximizers. They adopt a second goal next to maximization their discretionary income, namely food self-
sufficiency.  
 
This non-separability is a distinct farm household and village characteristic and not a market characteristic, 
realizing this is especially important in our study area, where land is very unequally distributed among 
different types of farm households. Therefore, we used a classification of six different types of households 
based on an existing typology in the farm household model, that we later aggregated to a village level. 
This model, developed on a GAMS platform, led to the development of optimization models that 
incorporate essential characteristics of each representative farmer and the environment in which they 
operate per type of farm household. Including the objectives, resources, possible activities and 
constraints per type of farm household, the status quo of farm household behavior in the villages was 
examined. 
 
The base run results showed that currently farmers use all the land that they have available for cultivation. 
In comparing the base run scenarios with the survey results, we observe some differences in cultivation in 
the lowland area; the cultivation of soybean-irrigated rice and the upland area; the cultivation of cassava. 
This because respectively risk considerations and livestock were not adopted in the model. Based on the 
base run, we can say that in general, the higher the self-insufficiencies in rice from the lowlands that farm 
households face and the more restrictive the possibilities to engage in off-farm work are, the more likely 
they are to practice intensive cultivation on the sloping land. This means that especially the poorest 
groups of farm households practice intensive crop cultivation on the slopes with short rotations and few 
fallow periods. 
 
We then invented 12 different scenarios for the set-aside of land and improvement of water availability in 
order to examine the total revenue impacts on the different land set-aside and water addition schemes 
from an individual, farm household and village perspective. It was showed that the schemes to set-aside 
upland areas alone could largely reduce revenues for farm households, especially for the poor farmers. 
The impact of the different scenarios on the average village revenues are small; however, especially the 
poor farm households seemed to benefit from compensation by additional irrigation. The analysis leads 
us to conclude that the allocation of new irrigable land could potentially be attractive from a social and 
private point of view, because poor farm households will relatively benefit more from the construction of 
new terrace land. However, coordination at the village or commune level and a deliberative choice to help 
the poorly endowed households is essential in order to achieve a distribution that has the support of and 
is beneficial to most of the households in the village and the poorly endowed households in particular. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
48 
If we want to find base for the implementation of land set-aside and water improvement scenarios, 
farmers have to be willing to voluntarily set-aside sloping land. Therefore, analyzed for what amount of 
water addition in the lowlands farm households will voluntarily choose to set-aside upland areas 
according to (1) 8% of the land of all farm households, (2) 870m2 of all households. We assumed that as 
rational behaving agents, the farmers will accept all payments that exceed the sum of the opportunity 
costs that they face, implementation costs they must undertake and transaction costs they bear. One 
disadvantage in searching for this cut-off point with the help of a linear programming model is the fact that 
we cannot analyze the optimal amount of land that a specific type of farm household would like to set-
aside. 
 
This study added to the existing literature on PES by analyzing payment mechanisms for the set-aside of 
upland areas from two levels. On a communal level, the amount of lowland that needs to be converted if 
irrigation infrastructures were provided was examined. It was showed that mainly because of the goal of 
food self-sufficiency, poor farm households face much lower opportunity costs per m2 of land to be set-
aside in return for additional lowland. Therefore, this way of distribution could allow for a reallocation of 
land and a better wealth distribution among farm households in the village. However, if the scheme is 
collectively negotiated, it is likely that there are (rich) households who do not benefit from the program 
and would therefore not be willing to engage in the program. Therefore, this would still imply a command 
and control framework for at least some types of farm households, something that we would want to 
overcome in developing a PES-like program. 
 
Under individual payment schemes with the allocation of additional terrace land, it was showed that the 
poorest types of farm households face much lower opportunity costs for the set aside of upland areas 
than the richer types of farm households. If the payment schemes would be set higher than the 
opportunity costs of the poor farm households but lower than those of the rich farm households, this 
would only lead the poor farm households to participate. Therefore, these individual schemes could lead 
to an improvement in the livelihoods of poor farm households while not affecting those of the richer farm 
households. Hence, this scheme could potentially lead to a welfare equalization. 
 
Discussion 
The results presented here indicate both an improvement in the sustainability of cultivation and thereby 
an improvement in the ecosystem services of the study area. However, there are some limitations to the 
proposed schemes. Firstly, conditionality is not enforced in the PES-like scheme. If no other mechanism 
to secure conditionality for the PES-like program will be invented, the program would risk farmers to 
return to cultivate the upland areas after payments are received. Therefore, it is necessary to find a 
mechanism that would secure conditionality and transfer the PES-like scheme into a PES-scheme.  
 
Secondly, the PES-like program builds upon the idea that a set-aside of upland by ES providers in 
upstream catchments will lead to more water available for ES buyers in downstream catchments. There is 
however quite some scientific debate on the extent to which this is correct. Therefore, further research on 
the likelihood of a restoration of the watershed functions downstream is necessary. In line with this, it is 
necessary to determine the baselines of both upland cultivated and water available in the study area, so 
that additionality could be examined.  
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Apart from the improvements that could be made in the proposed PES-like schemes, there are also some 
improvements that could be made in the linear programming model. First of all, all formulas in annex 1 
are measured over the seven time periods developed corresponding to the lean and peak seasons in 
labor on crop cultivation. Also measuring discretionary income over these time periods would however not 
be necessary and in fact incorrect since it measures the same interest rate on a possible loan over very 
differentiated time periods.  
 
Secondly, there is room for improvement in examining the discretionary income by including a 
consumption and/or energetic balance for the farm households. A lack of survey data did however not 
allow for a full consumption balance. Currently, the requirements for the staple crops maize and cassava 
in order to compensate one kilogram of rice consumption are overestimated and therefore do not reflect 
the calorie compensation but a compensation in the preference of consuming rice instead of maize and 
cassava. The linear weight loss corresponding to a shortage of rice that is included in the utility function 
punishes the farm households again for not meeting rice requirements. Therefore, it would be best to 
keep this linear weight loss in the utility function while at the same time implement a consumption and/or 
energetic balance that is more consistent with reality.  
 
Lastly, one disadvantage of the linear programming model is the fact that the solutions probably did not 
show the optimal point of land set-aside for farm households. Namely, it calculated the optimal 
compensation of different kinds of additional access to water given a certain level of land set-aside in the 
sloping compartment. Therefore, it would be good to estimate the opportunity costs for different amounts 
of land set-aside for different types of farm households. A dynamic instead of linear programming model 
would be better suited for this. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the methodology and results presented here could be of large value in an 
ex-ante analysis of PES-like programs that provide alternative payments and do not only look at individual 
resource flows. Moreover, the study could be of large use in coordination and deliberation at the level of 
local authorities and can contribute to ex ante assessments of PES policies targeted at ecosystem 
restoration by farmers. 
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Annex 1: Mathematical Description of the Model 
 
This annex presents the mathematical descriptions of the model used. The farm household model 
represents an average household for each farm household group as described in the typology. To 
simplify notations, we omitted the farm type subscripts in the equations below. Table 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 
below give a description of respectively the coefficients, indices and variables used in the model.  
 
EVERYTHING MEASURED PER TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD 
 
CROP PRODUCTION 
 
- Production equation 
0
,,,,,,
≥∑∑∑ ilz
z l i
tilzj XY  
The sum of the quantities of products that are produced in each period per land use system, per 
technology used, per agro-ecological zone.  
 
- Balance per product, per time period 
0*
,,,,,,,,,,1, =−−−++∑∑∑+ j
end
tjtjtjtjilz
z l i
tilzj
beg
tj UESCBXYE  
The initial stock of products of one period plus what the household produces plus what the household 
buys minus what the household consumes minus what the household sells corresponds to the ending 
balance of the previous period minus possible storage losses 
 
LABOR ALLOCATION 
 
- Labor balance per time period 
in
t
fam
tf
out
tilz
z l i
tilz LLLXL +≤+∑∑∑ ,,,,,,  
The labor that is devoted to different cropping activities or off-farm activities. Labor can be sold outside or 
into the farm. 
 
- Limitation on off-farm opportunities 
f
fam
tf
t
out
t dLL *,≤∑  
Off-farm labor opportunities per farm household type depend on the likelihood to find real off-farm 
opportunities. 
 
CONSUMPTION 
 
- Consumption of rice 
Rice
t
Rice
t
Rice
t MJHJCJ ≥+  
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Farmers have a preference for the consumption of rice. However, if consumption requirements cannot be 
met by the consumption of rice, either rice can be purchased on the market or substituted by the 
consumption of maize and cassava. 
 
- Minimum consumption of rice 
45.0*RicetRicet MJCJ ≥  
Not all rice can be substituted for maize and cassava; therefore, a minimum of 45% of food requirements 
has to be met by the consumption of rice. 
 
- Substitution of rice by maize 
Maize
t
Rice
t
Maize
t HJHJCJ +≥ 2*  
2 kg of maize necessary to compensate 1 kg of rice 
 
- Substitution of maize by cassava 
2*Maizet
Cassava
t HJCJ ≥  
2 kg of cassava necessary to compensate 1 kg of maize. 
Here, we enforced a hierarchy in the preferences for staple crops: (1) rice, (2) maize, (3) cassava without 
having to develop a full energetic balance (including energy, protein and other nutrient needs) that would 
describe adequately the consumption function. 
 
LAND CONSTRAINTS 
 
- Land constraint equation 
fz
z l i
ilz AX ,,, ≤∑∑∑  
The total land use system per technology per zone is limited by the available land per farm household per 
zone 
 
- Restriction on use of ginger 
fz
Gi
t AJ ,1*05.0≤  
Ginger is normally only cultivated in the gardens of the farmer and due to the fluctuations in price and 
market access will remain a side activity to farmers. 
 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
 
- Discretionary Income: 
 
Max Z = 
end
t
t
t
m
tj
j
m
tj
t
ilz
t
tilz
z l i
t
t
Hin
t
fam
tf
t
Hout
t
j
ilzj
t
beg
t
KRQCPCXPI
trLwtrLWXPJK
=−−−
+−−++
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑+
,,,,,,,
,,,1 )1(*)1(*
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The farm household is assumed to maximize its discretionary income (Z). The initial stock of capital plus 
the earnings from products that are sold and labor that is hired out minus labor that is hired in, inputs for 
cropping systems that are bought, the costs for food that has to be bought and the interest rate on 
borrowing. It is possible to borrow, but this has to be repaid at the end of the period. Therefore, each 
period t1 starts with a positive cash balance. The starting cash flow of one period equalizes the ending of 
cash flow of the previous period. The crop products produced on-farm are valued at the farm-gate prices, 
whereas products are valued at the prevailing market prices. 
 
- Utility Function 
 
Max U =  
end
t
Rice
tt
t
t
m
tj
c
m
tj
t
ilz
t
tilz
z l i
t
t
Hin
t
fam
tf
t
Hout
t
j
ilzj
t
beg
t
KHJNRQCPCXPI
trLwtrLWXPJK
=−−−−
+−−++
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑+
*
)1(*)1(*
,,,,,,,
,,,1
 
Discretionary income minus a linear weight loss for a rice shortage. 
 
Table 1.1 Selected coefficients of the model 
Coefficients Description Unit of measurement 
Beg
tjE 1, +  
Initial stock of products at the beginning of the first 
time period 
Kg/time period 
iU  Possible storage losses Kg/time period 
zlitL  Labor requirements in each period per land use system per technology per agro-ecological zone 
Days/ha 
tizlY ,,,  Products produced in each time period per land use system per technology per agro-ecological zone 
Kg/ha 
fam
tfL ,  
Family labor available per farm type per time period Days/time period 
fd  Limitation to off-farm opportunities per farm household type 
Days/year 
Beg
tK 1+  
Initial stock of capital Million VND/period 1 
jPJ  Price per product Million VND/kg 
Hout
tW  
Wage of off-farm labor per time period Million VND/day 
tr Transaction costs Million VND/day 
Hin
tW  Wage of labor hired into the farm per time period Million VND/day 
tilzPI ,,,  Price of technology in each period per land use 
system per technology per agro-ecological zone 
Million VND/unit 
m
tjPC ,1  Market price of staple consumption good per time period 
Million VND/Kg 
fzA ,  Available land per agro-ecological zone per farm household 
Ha/zone 
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Table 1.2 Selected indices of the model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 Selected variables of the model 
Variables Description Unit of measurement 
ilzX ,,  Land use system per technology per zone Ha/year 
tiB ,  Products bought per time period Kg/time period 
tiC ,  Products consumed per time period Kg/time period 
tiS ,  Products sold per time period Kg/time period 
End
tjE ,  
Stock of products at the end of the time period Kg/time period 
out
tL  
Labor that is hired out per time period Days/time period 
in
tL  
Labor that is hired in per time period Days/time period 
tL  Labor other than family labor used for on-farm work Days/time period 
m
tjQC ,  Quantity of staple products bought from the market per time period 
Kg/time period 
 
tR  Costs and interest on loans Million VND/time period 
end
tK  
Capital at the end of the time period Million VND/time period 
oduct
tCJ
Pr
 
Consumption of product per time period. Three sub-
sets: 
Rice
tCJ Consumption of rice per time period 
Maize
tCJ  Consumption of maize per time period 
Cassava
tCJ  Consumption of cassava per time period 
Kg/time period 
oduct
tHJ
Pr
 
Shortage of product per time period 
Rice
tHJ  Shortage of rice per time period 
Maize
tHJ Shortage of maize per time period (only if 
shortage of rice) 
Kg/time period 
rice
tMJ  
Minimum rice needs per time period Kg/time period 
oduct
tJ
Pr
 
Production of Product. Sub-set: 
Gi
tJ Production of ginger 
Ha/year 
tN  Linear weight loss for rice shortage Kg/time period 
Indices Description 
z Agro-ecological zone 
l Land-use system 
i  Technology (inputs) 
j Products 
J = all products 
J1 = staple goods 
t Time Periods 
f Farm Type 
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Annex 2: Data 
 
This annex presents an overview of the most important data incorporated in the linear programming 
model that is used in this thesis. 
 
Table 2.1 Agro-ecological zones 
Agro-Ecological Zone Type of Land 
Paddy land with spring and summer irrigation Irrigated lowland spring and summer 
Paddy land with summer irrigation only Irrigated lowland summer 
Terrace land with spring and summer irrigation Irrigated lowland spring and summer 
Terrace land with summer irrigation only Irrigated lowland summer 
Sloping land Upland 
Perennials Perennials 
 
Table 2.2 Products corresponding to land use systems, technologies and agro-ecological zone 
Product Land Use System Level of 
inputs 
Agro-Ecological 
Zone 
Cardamom Cardamom - Perennials 
Cassava Cassava - Upland  
Cinnamon Cinnamon - Perennials 
Ginger Ginger - Upland  
Maize Maize spring cycle High Upland  
Maize Maize spring cycle Low Upland 
Maize-Maize Maize spring and summer cycle High Upland  
Maize-Maize Maize spring and summer cycle Low Upland 
Maize-Peanuts Maize-peanuts - Upland  
Peanuts Peanuts - Upland  
Irrigated Rice  Irrigated rice summer cycle  Low Irrigated lowland 
summer 
Irrigated Rice  Irrigated rice summer cycle  Medium Irrigated lowland 
summer 
Irrigated Rice Irrigated rice summer cycle  High Irrigated lowland 
summer 
Irrigated Rice-Irrigated 
Rice 
Irrigated rice spring and summer 
cycle 
Low Irrigated lowland 
spring and summer 
Irrigated Rice-Irrigated 
Rice 
Irrigated rice spring and summer 
cycle 
Medium Irrigated lowland 
spring and summer 
Irrigated Rice-Irrigated 
Rice 
Irrigated rice spring and summer 
cycle 
High Irrigated lowland 
spring and summer 
Soybean Soybean spring cycle - Sloping 
Soybean  Soybean summer cycle - Sloping 
Soybean-Soybean Soybean spring and summer cycle - Sloping 
Soybean-Irrigated Rice Soybean spring-irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
Low Irrigated lowland 
summer 
Soybean-Irrigated Rice Soybean spring-irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
Medium Irrigated lowland 
summer 
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Soybean-Irrigated Rice Soybean spring-irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
High Irrigated lowland 
summer 
Sweet potato Sweet potato - Sloping 
Tea Tea - Perennials 
Maize-Cassava 3 years maize – 3 years cassava - Sloping 
Upland Rice 1 year upland rice – 2 years fallow - Sloping 
Upland Rice-Maize-
Cassava 
2 years upland rice – 3 years 
maize – 2 years cassava – 3 
years fallow 
- Sloping 
Upland Rice-Cassava 2 years upland rice – 2 years 
cassava – 2 years fallow 
- Sloping 
 
Table 2.3 Technologies (Inputs) per land use system 
Land Use System Input 
level 
NPK 
(5-10-3) 
(Bag 50 Kg) 
Nitrogen 
(Kg) 
Pesticides 
(Package / 
Bottle) 
Herbicides 
(Package) 
Kg hybrid 
variety 
seeds 
Maize spring cycle Low 2    30 
Maize spring cycle High 8    30 
Maize spring and 
summer cycle 
Low 4    60 
Maize spring and 
summer cycle 
High 16    60 
Irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
Low   5 a)  30 
Irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
Medium 8 20 5 a) 
5 b) 
 30 
Irrigated rice 
summer cycle 
High 15 40 10 b) 3  30 
Irrigated rice spring 
and summer cycle 
Low   10 a)  70 
Irrigated rice spring 
and summer cycle 
Medium 20 50 10 a) 
10 b) 
 70 
Irrigated rice spring 
and summer cycle 
High 40 100 20 b) 6  70 
Soybean-Irrigated 
Rice 
Low   5 a)  30 
Soybean-Irrigated 
Rice 
Medium 8 20 5 a)  30 
Soybean-Irrigated 
Rice 
High 15 40 5 b) 3  30 
a)
 Package 
b) Bottle 
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Table 2.4 Labor requirements per land use system in days/ha per time period 
Land Use System T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 Total  
Cardamom 0 0 0 9 0 9 40 58 
Cassava 6 4 95 40 0 35 15 195 
Cinnamon 0 0 20 14.3 0 0 14.3 48.6 
Ginger 0 0 45 90 30 20 50 235 
Maize spring cycle 0 0 75 90 0 20 20 205 
Maize spring cycle 0 0 75 90 0 20 20 205 
Maize spring and summer 
cycle 0 0 75 90 0 40 160 365 
Maize spring and summer 
cycle 0 0 75 90 0 40 160 365 
Maize-peanuts 0 0 75 90 0 20 195 380 
Peanuts 0 0 0 0 0 0 195 195 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  0 0 60 50 0 25 0 135 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  0 0 0 0 0 60 75 135 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  0 0 60 50 0 85 75 270 
Irrigated rice spring and 
summer cycle 0 0 60 73 0 42 0 175 
Irrigated rice spring and 
summer cycle 0 0 10 50 20 0 40 120 
Irrigated rice spring and 
summer cycle 0 0 34 48.5 15 31 61 189.5 
Soybean spring cycle 0 0 34 48.5 15 31 61 189.5 
Soybean summer cycle 0 0 34 48.5 15 31 61 189.5 
Soybean spring and 
summer cycle 54.5 43.5 28 54 97.5 31 61 369.5 
Soybean spring-irrigated 
rice summer cycle 54.5 43.5 28 54 97.5 31 61 369.5 
Soybean spring-irrigated 
rice summer cycle 54.5 43.5 28 54 97.5 31 61 369.5 
Soybean spring-irrigated 
rice summer cycle 0 40 40 55 97.5 31 61 324.5 
Sweet potato 0 40 40 55 97.5 31 61 324.5 
Tea 0 40 40 55 97.5 31 61 324.5 
3 years maize – 3 years 
cassava 3 2 80 60 0 37.5 162.5 345 
1 year upland rice – 2 years 
fallow 0 0 0 23.3 0 17 23.3 63.6 
2 years upland rice – 3 
years maize – 2 years 
cassava – 3 years fallow 1.2 0.8 38.5 46 0 29.2 62 177.7 
2 years upland rice – 2 
years cassava – 2 years 
fallow 2 1.3 31.7 33.6 0 11.7 12.7 93 
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Table 2.5 Yields per land use system, per technology (inputs), per product per product 
Land Use System Level of inputs Product Yield (kg/ha) 
Cardamom - Cardamom 770 
Cassava - Cassava 7196 
Cinnamon - Cinnamon 2132 
Ginger - Ginger 10000 
Maize spring cycle High Maize 2400 
Maize spring cycle Low Maize 2200 
Maize spring and summer cycle High Maize 4000 
Maize spring and summer cycle Low Maize 4800 
Maize-peanuts - Maize 2400 
Maize-peanuts - Peanuts 850 
Peanuts - Peanuts 900 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  Low Irrigated rice 3000 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  Medium Irrigated rice 4000 
Irrigated rice summer cycle  High Irrigated rice 5000 
Irrigated rice spring and summer cycle Low Irrigated rice 6000 
Irrigated rice spring and summer cycle Medium Irrigated rice 8000 
Irrigated rice spring and summer cycle High Irrigated rice 10000 
Soybean spring cycle - Soybean 660 
Soybean summer cycle - Soybean 660 
Soybean spring and summer cycle - Soybean 1320 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle Low Soybean 660 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle Low Irrigated rice 3000 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle Medium Soybean 660 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle Medium Irrigated rice 4000 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle High Soybean 660 
Soybean spring-irrigated rice summer cycle High Irrigated rice 5000 
Sweet potato - Sweet potato 3500 
Tea - Tea 3000 
3 years maize – 3 years cassava - Maize 1200 
3 years maize – 3 years cassava  Cassava 3996 
1 year upland rice – 2 years fallow - Upland rice 357 
2 years upland rice – 3 years maize – 2 years 
cassava – 3 years fallow 
- 
Upland rice 214 
2 years upland rice – 3 years maize – 2 years 
cassava – 3 years fallow 
- 
Maize 1566 
2 years upland rice – 3 years maize – 2 years 
cassava – 3 years fallow 
- 
Cassava 1599 
2 years upland rice – 2 years cassava – 2 years 
fallow 
- 
Upland rice 357 
2 years upland rice – 2 years cassava – 2 years 
fallow 
- 
Cassava 2665 
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Table 2.6 Buying and selling price of products 
Product Farm-Gate Price  
(Million VND) 
Market Price 
(Million VND) 
Cardamom 10.75 - 
Cassava 1.67 3 
Cinnamon 4 - 
Ginger 3.3 - 
Maize 3.75 - 
Peanuts 7.5 - 
Irrigated rice 4.5 8 
Soybean 8 - 
Sweet potato 3.5 - 
Tea 5 - 
Upland rice 10 15 
 
 
Table 2.7 Time periods and main activities 
Time Period Dates Main Activities 
T1 1-12-2008 / 15-1-2009 Ploughing irrigated lowland (2 cycles) 
T2 16-1-2009 / 20-2-2009 Transplanting (2 cycles) 
T3 21-2-2009 / 20-3-2009 Weeding irrigated lowland (2 cycles) and perennials, 
ploughing upland, harvesting cassava 
T4 21-3-2009 / 31-5-2009 Ploughing irrigated lowland (1 cycle), ploughing and 
seeding upland crops, harvesting cinnamon, harvesting 
irrigated rice (2 cycles) 
T5 1-6-2009 / 20-6-2009 Harvesting upland crops, ploughing and transplanting 
irrigated lowland (2 cycles) 
T6 21-6-2009 / 30-7-2009 Weeding irrigated lowland (1 and 2 cycles), harvesting 
upland crops, weeding cardamom, harvesting tea 
T7 31-7-2009 / 30-11-2009 Harvesting irrigated rice (1 and 2 cycles), harvesting upland 
crops, harvesting perennials 
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 Annex 3: GAMS-scripts 
 
$TITLE:  FARM HOUSEHOLD MODEL YEN BAI PROVINCE 
option limcol = 60; 
option limrow = 60; 
option lp = bdmlp; 
*OPTION LP= GAMSCHK; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Initial Author:  Esther Boere/Damien Jourdain 
* Last Modifications:     Esther Boere 
* Last editing:           2010-08-16 
* Version:                27 
* Project:                CPWF PN11 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*IMPORT DATA FROM OUTSIDE 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*RUN ONLY WSLS 
*To run only when not using the general program TradeGeneral.gms, otherwise make as comment: 
$call gams selWSLS.gms 
*READ FROM EXCEL DATA 
*Link to text file to import all data from sets and parameters from excel file 
$CALL GDXXRW.EXE @import.txt 
*Link to text file to import data on farmers and calibration coefficients from excel file 
$CALL GDXXRW.EXE @importFarmers.txt 
*LOAD SPECIFIED ITEMS FROM GDX FILE 
*Links the different imported data to each other (e.g. crops and yield per ha) 
$GDXIN data.gdx 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SETS (Imported from Excel) 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SETS 
zone          gro-ecological zones 
time             ime periods 
lut              and uses (i.e. cropping systems 
crop             rop produced 
inputs           nputs used for crop production 
lc(lut,crop)     crops of each lut 
; 
 
*To load specified items from GDX file 
$LOAD zone time lut crop inputs lc 
 
SET STAPLE (Crop) Subset of staple crops /cIR, cUR, cCA, cMA/ ; 
SET SOYB(LUT) Subset of soybean related cropping systems in the irrigated area /SBIR2L, SBIR2M, 
SBIR2H, MA1PE/; 
SET SPRICE(LUT) Subset of spring rice cropping systems /IR1IR2L, IR1IR2M, IR1IR2H /; 
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*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*PARAMETERS (Imported from Excel) 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PARAMETERS 
Labsup(time)                      family labour available in each time period (day per person) 
Periodsize(time)                  nb of days per period 
Labreqinv(lut, time)              labour requirements for each land use (days per ha) 
Landreq(lut,zone)                 land requirements (used for evaluation which lut is feasible where) 
Inputamounts(lut,inputs,time)     inputs required for each lut during each period 
Inputprice(inputs)               input prices (in 000 VND per unit) 
Saleprice(crop)                   saling price of crop (in 000 VND per kg) 
Buyprice (crop)                   buying price of crop (in 000 VND per kg) 
Yield(lut,crop,time)              yields (in kg per ha) 
; 
 
*To load specified items from GDX file 
$LOAD labsup periodsize labreqinv landreq inputamounts inputprice saleprice buyprice yield 
$GDXIN 
 
*FROM DAMIEN 
*Matrix inversion of labor requirement 
PARAMETER labreq(time, lut); 
labreq(time, lut) = labreqinv(lut,time); 
 
$GDXIN dataFarm.gdx 
*Import farmer groups 
SET FG   farm types ; 
 
PARAMETERS 
hhmembers(fg)           Household members 
workforce(fg)           No of persons of working age 
budgetavail(fg)         Budget available at the beginning of the simulation 
land(zone,fg)           Land available in the different zones 
productbeg(crop,fg)     Initial stock of crops 
sBUYCOEF(fg)            Max proportion of food crop purchased (calibration coefficient) 
sLIMSALAB(fg)           Max percentage of labour sale at a given period (calibration coefficient) 
; 
 
$LOAD FG hhmembers workforce budgetavail land productbeg sbuycoef slimsalab 
$GDXIN 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Select the farm type (VERY IMPORTANT!!!) 
$include "selectFarm.inc" 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
PARAMETERS hhsize, limlab ; 
hhsize = SUM(sf, hhmembers(sf)); 
limlab = SUM(sf, SLIMSALAB(sf)); 
 
SCALAR 
LABOURPRICE       Price of labour in thousand VND per day /50/ 
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; 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
vCROP(lut, zone)          Area devoted to the particular land use system 
vBUYLABOUR(time)  Labour to buy per time period 
vSALELABOUR(time)   Labour to sell per time period 
vCASHBEGIN(time)      Cash in the first period 
vCASHEND(time)          Opening of one cash period equalizes ending of previous period 
vQPROD(crop,time)      Production per crop per time period 
vQBEG(crop, time)         Initial stock per crop per time period 
vCONS(crop,time)         Consumption per crop per time period 
vBUY(crop,time)           Buy per crop per time period 
vSALE(crop,time)          Sell per crop per time period 
vQEND(crop, time)         Opening of one crop in one period equalizes ending of previous period 
vBORROW(time)           Possibility to borrow money in decades 
vtotalLUT(lut)            Total land use 
vRICEPROD(time)         Rice production (in kg) during period T 
vRICECONS(time)         Rice consumption (in kg) during period T 
vRICESHORT(time)       Rice shortage (in kg) during period T 
vMAIZESHORT(time)     Maize shortage (in kg) during period T 
; 
 
FREE VARIABLES 
vUT         Objective utility maximization including linear weight loss function for rice shortage 
*vMB                 Objective function of income maximization no linear weight loss function 
; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*DECLARATION OF EQUATIONS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EQUATIONS 
* OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
B_OBJECTIVE              Maximize the utility function 
*B_MARGIN                 Objective function in VND 
 
* CROP PRODUCTION 
B_PROD(crop,time)      Production of commodities 
B_BEG(SF,crop)            Initial stock of the crop 
B_BAL(CROP, time)     Balance per crop 
B_END(crop,time)         Transfer from one period to the other per crop 
*Include some storage losses between periods (disincentive to store over time) 
B_RICEPROD(time)      Total production of rice 
*Combine upland and lowland 
C_MINPROD(sf,crop)    No more than X% of food consumed can be bought 
 
*LABOUR ALLOCATION 
B_LABOUR(SF,TIME)   Labour constraint in working days 
C_LABSALELIM(SF, TIME)   Constraint on the ability to hire out labour 
*Cannot sale more than x percent of the available family labour 
 
*CASH FLOW 
B_BUDGETBEG(SF)    Budget time period 1 
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B_BUDGET1(SF,time) Budget constraint in VND not including interest rate 
B_BUDGET2(SF,time)   Budget constraint in VND including interest rate 
B_BUDGETEND(time)   Budget to pass on to next period 
 
*CONSUMPTION 
B_RICECONS(time)      Rice consumption 
B_RICEMIN(sf,time)      Minimum rice requirements per farm household 
C_RICESHORTMIN      A minimum of x% of rice needs fulfilled 
**The farmers cannot only count on substitution for eating 
**A minimum of 45% of the rice needs should be fulfilled by rice (!) 
B_MAIZEMIN(time)       Minimum maize requirements caused by a shortage of rice 
B_CASSMIN(time)        Minimum cassava requirements caused by a shortage of rice 
 
*LAND CONSTRAINTS 
B_LAND(SF,ZONE)     Land constraint per zone 
C_GINLIM(SF)              Limitation of the area devoted to ginger 
C_SPLIM(SF)               Sweet potatoe rotation no more than 20% of the area 
C_NOBUYUR(time)       No possibility to buy upland rice 
; 
 
PARAMETER LZ(lut,zone); 
LZ(lut,zone)$(LANDREQ(Lut,Zone)=1) = YES; 
DISPLAY LZ; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*PARAMETERS FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Set at their initial values, FROM DAMIEN 
 
PARAMETER sLANDADJUST(zone) Adjustment of the land area for simulation; 
sLANDADJUST(zone) = 0; 
SCALAR sWFADJUST                  Adjustment of the no of workers; 
sWFadjust = 0; 
SCALAR sHHSIZEadj                  Adjustment of the no of rice eaters; 
SHHSIZEadj = 0; 
PARAMETER skPRICE(crop)     Adjustment of the prices of crops (buying and selling); 
skPRICE(crop) = 1; 
 
SCALAR 
LIVINGEXP         Living expenses in thousand VND per day          /0/ 
sWSHORT           Weight of rice shortage on the utility function  /7/ 
 
TCL                Transaction costs in the labour market           /0.20/ 
TCC                Transaction costs on the crop markets            /0.20/ 
sINT               Interest rates                                    /1.03/ 
vDAYCONSRICE      Minimum daily consumption of rice                /0.5/ 
*vMINDAYCONSRICE   Absolute minimum consumption of rice             /0.4/; 
; 
 
*CALCULATE MARGINS 
PARAMETER marginsWithLabour(lut); 
marginsWithLabour(lut) = SUM((crop,time), yield(lut, crop, time) * saleprice(crop)* skPRICE(crop)) 
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                 - SUM((inputs,time), inputamounts(lut, inputs, time)*inputprice(inputs)) 
                 - SUM(time,  LABREQ(time,Lut) * LABOURPRICE *(1+TCL)) ; 
*BY ZONE 
PARAMETER marg1; 
marg1(lut, zone) =  marginsWithLabour(lut)$LZ(lut,zone) ; 
 
PARAMETER marginsWithoutLabour(lut); 
marginsWithoutLabour(lut) = SUM((crop,time), yield(lut, crop, time) * saleprice(crop)* skPRICE(crop)) 
                 - SUM((inputs,time), inputamounts(lut, inputs, time)*inputprice(inputs)); 
*BY ZONE 
PARAMETER marg2; 
marg2(lut,zone) =   marginsWithoutLabour(lut)$LZ(lut,zone); 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*DECLARATION OF EQUATIONS: B_for balances, C_for constraints 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZE INCOME (WITHOUT LINEAR WEIGHT LOSS FUNCTION) 
*B_MARGIN..              vCASHEND("T6")- SUM(TIME, vBORROW("T6") * 1.2) =E= vMB ; 
*B_OBJECTIVE ..       vCASHEND("NOV3")- SUM(DEC, vBORROW(DEC)*1.01) =E= vUT; 
 
* OBJECTIVE: MAXIMIZE UTILITY (CHANGED BECAUSE OF WEIGHT LOSS FUNCTION FOR RICE 
SHORTAGE) 
B_OBJECTIVE..          vCASHEND("T6") 
                           - vBORROW("T6") * 1.2 =E= vUT ; 
*                          - Sum(time, vRICESHORT(time))* sWSHORT   =e= vUT; 
 
$ONTEXT 
B_OBJECTIVE ..            SUM((crop, TIME), vSALE(crop, TIME)*SALEPRICE(crop)) 
                           - SUM((staple, TIME), vBUY(staple, TIME)* BUYPRICE(staple)) 
                           - SUM((lut,inputs,TIME), INPUTAMOUNTS(lut, inputs, TIME) 
                           *INPUTCOSTS(inputs)*sum(zone$(LANDREQ(Zone,Lut)=1), vCROP(lut,zone))) 
                           - SUM(TIME, vBUYLABOUR(TIME)*LABOURPRICE*(1+transCost)) 
                           + SUM(TIME, vSALELABOUR(TIME)*LABOURPRICE*(1-transCost)) 
                          - SUM(TIME, PERIODSIZE(TIME)*LIVINGEXP*FGHHMEMBERS) 
                           - Sum(time, vborrow(DEC) *1.2) 
                          =E= vMB ; 
$OFFTEXT 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*CROP PRODUCTION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B_PROD(crop,time)..      vQPROD(crop, time) 
                         =L= SUM(lut, YIELD(lut,crop, time)*SUM(zone, vCrop(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone))) ; 
 
B_BEG(SF, CROP)..        vQBEG(crop, "T7") =L= PRODUCTBEG(CROP,SF); 
 
B_BAL(CROP, time)..      vQBEG(crop, time) + vQPROD(crop, time) 
                         - vCONS(crop, time) + vBUY(crop,time) 
                         - vSALE(crop, time) =G= vQEND(crop, time); 
 
B_END(crop,time)$(ORD(time)<CARD(time))..    vQBEG(crop,time+1) =L= .99 * vQEND(crop,time) ; 
 
B_RICEPROD(time)..       vQPROD("cUR" , time)+ vQPROD("cIR", time) =g= vRICEPROD(time); 
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C_MINPROD(sf, crop)$staple(crop)..       SUM(time, vBUY(crop,time)) =l= 
                                         SUM(time, vCONS(crop,time)) * sBUYCOEF(SF); 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*LABOUR ALLOCATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B_LABOUR(SF, TIME)..     SUM(lut, SUM(zone, vCrop(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone)) * 
LABREQ(time,Lut)) 
                         - vBUYLABOUR(time) + vSALELABOUR(time) 
                         =L= labsup(time) * (workforce(SF) + sWFAdjust) ; 
 
C_LABSALELIM(SF,time)..  vSALELABOUR(time) =L= LABSUP(time)*workforce(sf)* sLIMSALAB(SF) ; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*CASH FLOW 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B_BUDGETBEG(SF)..        vCASHBEGIN("T7") =L= BUDGETAVAIL(SF); 
 
B_BUDGET1(SF, TIME)$(ord(time)=1).. 
                          vCASHBEGIN(time) 
                         - LIVINGEXP*PERIODSIZE(time)*hhmembers(sf) 
                         - SUM(crop, vBUY(crop, time)* SALEPRICE(crop)*skPRICE(crop)* (1+TCC) ) 
                         + SUM(CROP, vSALE(crop, time)*SALEPRICE(CROP)* skPRICE(crop)) 
                         + (vSALELABOUR(time)*LABOURPRICE*(1-TCL)) 
                         - (vBUYLABOUR(time)*LABOURPRICE*(1+TCL)) 
                         - SUM((lut,inputs), INPUTAMOUNTS(lut, inputs, time)*inputprice(inputs) 
                                 *SUM(zone, vCrop(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone))) 
                         + vBORROW(time) 
                         =G= vCASHEND(time) ; 
 
B_BUDGET2(SF, TIME)..      vCASHBEGIN(time) 
                         - LIVINGEXP*PERIODSIZE(time)*hhmembers(sf) 
                         - SUM(crop, vBUY(crop, time)* SALEPRICE(crop)*skPRICE(crop) * (1+TCC)) 
                         + SUM(CROP, vSALE(crop, time)*SALEPRICE(CROP)*skPRICE(crop) ) 
                         + (vSALELABOUR(time)*LABOURPRICE*(1-TCL)) 
                         - (vBUYLABOUR(time)*LABOURPRICE*(1+TCL)) 
                         - SUM((lut,inputs), INPUTAMOUNTS(lut, inputs, time)*inputprice(inputs) 
                                 *SUM(zone, vCrop(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone))) 
                         - vBORROW(time-1)* sINT + vBORROW(time) 
                         =G= vCASHEND(time) ; 
 
B_BUDGETEND(time)$(ord(time)<card(time))..   vCASHEND(time) =G= vCASHBEGIN(time+1) ; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*CONSUMPTION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*merge upland and lowland rice in terms of consumption 
B_RICECONS(time)..       vCONS("cUR", time)+ vCONS("cIR", time) =G= vRICECONS(time); 
 
B_RICEMIN(SF,time)..      vRICECONS(time) + vRICESHORT(time) 
                         =G= vDAYCONSRICE * PERIODSIZE(time) * (hhmembers(SF) + sHHSIZEadj); 
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PARAMETER ricemincons; 
RICEMINCONS =            SUM((sf,time), 
                         vDAYCONSRICE * PERIODSIZE(time) * (hhmembers(sf) + sHHSIZEadj)); 
 
C_RICESHORTMIN.. SUM(time, vRICECONS(time)) =G= ricemincons * 0.4; 
 
B_MAIZEMIN(time)..        vCONS("cMA",time) =G= vRICESHORT(time)* 2 + vMAIZESHORT(time) ; 
**NEED 2 KG OF MAIZE TO COMPENSATE FOR RICE? 
 
B_CASSMIN(time)..         vCONS("cCA", time) =g= vMAIZESHORT(time)*2  ; 
**NEED 2KG of CASSAVA TO COMPENSATE FOR 1K MAIZE 
 
*Absolute minimum consumption per day per persons 
*B_RICEABSMIN(time)..  vRICECONS(time) =g=  vMINDAYCONSRICE * PERIODSIZE(time) * 
FGHHMEMBERS ; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*LAND CONSTRAINTS AND CALCULATIONS 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B_LAND(SF,zone)..        SUM(lut, vCROP(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone)) =l= (LAND(zone,SF) + 
sLANDADJUST(zone))/10000; 
 
*Not more than 400m2 of upland area with ginger 
C_GINLIM(SF)..            vCROP("GI","SLOPING") =L= 400/10000 ; 
 
*Not more than 20% of the upland area with sweet potato 
C_SPLIM(SF)..             vCROP("SP","SLOPING") =L=  (LAND("SLOPING",SF) + 
sLANDADJUST("SLOPING")) /(5*10000); 
 
C_NOBUYUR(time)..  vBUY("cUR", time) =L= 0; 
 
*QCALCLUT(lut) ..          vtotalLUT(lut) =l= SUM(zone, vCrop(lut,zone)*LANDREQ(lut,zone)) ; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
PARAMETER sbuy; 
sbuy = SUM(sf, sBUYCOEF(sf)); 
PARAMETER solCrops(lut); 
 
MODEL FHHYENBAI /ALL/; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT ; 
solCrops(lut) = SUM(zone, vCrop.l(lut, zone))*10000; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 0 - BASE SCENARIO 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*BASE SCENARIO 
PARAMETER landold(zone,fg); 
landold(zone,fg) = land(zone, fg); 
DISPLAY landold; 
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land(zone, fg) = landold(zone, fg); 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
 
PARAMETER srSOLV; 
srSOLV("S00",SF) = FHHYENBAI.solvestat; 
PARAMETER srMODEL; 
srMODEL("S00",SF) = FHHYENBAI.modelstat; 
PARAMETER srOBJ; 
srOBJ("S00", SF) = vUT.l; 
PARAMETER srLAND; 
srLAND("S00", SF, ZONE) = LAND(zone, sf); 
PARAMETER srCROP; 
srCROP("S00", SF, lut,zone) = vCrop.l(lut,zone); 
PARAMETER srPROD; 
srPROD("S00", SF, crop,time) = vQPROD.l(crop,time); 
PARAMETER srCASHOBJ; 
srCASHOBJ("S00", SF) = vCASHEND.l("T6") - vBORROW.l("T6"); 
PARAMETER srSALE, srPURC, srCONS; 
srSALE("S00", SF, crop,time) = vSALE.l(crop,time); 
srPURC("S00", SF, crop,time) = vBUY.l(crop,time); 
srCONS("S00", SF, crop,time) = vCONS.l(crop,time); 
PARAMETER srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW; 
srBUYLAB("S00", SF, time) = vBUYLABOUR.l(time); 
srSALLAB("S00", SF, time) = vSALELABOUR.l(time); 
srCASHBEG("S00", SF, time) = vCASHBEGIN.l(time); 
srBORROW("S00", SF)  = vBORROW.l("T6")*1.2; 
PARAMETER srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
srRSHORT("S00",SF) = sum(time, vRICESHORT.l(time)); 
srSALLABCASH("S00", SF) = sum(time, vSALELABOUR.l(time)*LABOURPRICE*(1-TCL)); 
srPURCASH("S00",SF)  = sum((crop, time),  vBUY.l(crop, time)* SALEPRICE(crop)*skPRICE(crop) * 
(1+TCC)); 
srCROPSALE("S00", SF) = sum((crop,time), vSALE.l(crop,time)*SALEPRICE(CROP)*skPRICE(crop)); 
srCASHEND("S00", SF) = vCASHEND.l("T6"); 
srLAND("S00", SF, ZONE) = LAND(zone, sf); 
 
*EXPORT ALL PARAMETERS TO GDX S0 FILE; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S00.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*BASE SCENARIO 
*DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MAJORITY OF TERRACES AND MAJORITY OF PADDY 
SET woTer(FG) /OFFW, PARI/; 
SET wiTer(FG) /WSLS, WSLR, TERUPL, TERLAB/; 
*DISTINGUISH BETWEEN POOR AND NON-POOR 
SET poor(FG) /WSLS, WSLR/; 
SET nonpoor(FG) /TERLAB, TERUPL, OFFW, PARI/; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 1      8% OF LAND SET ASIDE FOR ALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
*                CONVERT IRRIGATED LOWLAND SUMMER TO SPRING + SUMMER 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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*Restore initial value 
land(zone,fg) = landold(zone,fg); 
 
*Reduce 8% of sloping land 
LAND("SLOPING", FG) = landold("SLOPING", FG) * 0.92; 
 
*convert IRRTER_SU en IRRTER_SP for those who mainly have terrases 
land("IRRTER_SU", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.832; 
land("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) + landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.168; 
*convert IRRPAD_SU en IRRPAD_SP for those who mainly have paddy land 
land("IRRPAD_SU", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.832; 
land("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) + landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.168; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
*EXPORT ALL PARAMETERS TO GDX S01 FILE; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S01.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 2      8% OF LAND SET ASIDE FOR ALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
*                CONSTRUCT NEW TERRACES WITH SUMMER IRRIGATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone, FG) = landold(zone,FG); 
 
*Reduce sloping of 8% 
land("sloping", FG) = landold("sloping", FG) * 0.92; 
 
*Add ?? m2 of IRRTER_SU 
land("IRRTER_SU", FG) = landold("IRRTER_SU", FG) + 32.4; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S02.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 3      8% OF LAND SET ASIDE FOR ALL FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
*                CONSTRUCT NEW TERRACES WITH SPRING AND SUMMER IRRIGATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone, FG) = landold(zone,FG); 
 
*Reduce sloping of 8% 
land("sloping", FG) = landold("sloping", FG) * 0.92; 
 
*Add ?? m2 of IRRTER_SP 
land("IRRTER_SP", FG) = landold("IRRTER_SP", FG) + 16.5; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S03.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
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srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 4      REDUCE SLOPING LAND WITH 869 M2 
*                CONVERT IRRIGATED LOWLAND SUMMER TO SPRING + SUMMER 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone,fg) = landold(zone,fg); 
 
*reduce sloping of 869 m2 per household 
land("sloping", fg) = landold("sloping", fg) - 869; 
 
*convert IRRTER_SU en IRRTER_SP for those who mainly have terrases 
land("IRRTER_SU", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.6915; 
land("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) + landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.3085; 
*convert IRRPAD_SU en IRRPAD_SP for those who mainly have paddy land 
land("IRRPAD_SU", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.6915; 
land("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) + landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.3085; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S04.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 5      REDUCE SLOPING LAND WITH 869 M2 
*                CONSTRUCT NEW TERRACES WITH SUMMER IRRIGATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone,FG) = landold(zone,FG); 
 
*reduce sloping of 869 m2 per household 
land("SLOPING", FG) = landold("SLOPING", FG) - 869; 
 
*Add ?? m2 of IRRTER_SU 
land("IRRTER_SU", FG) = landold("IRRTER_SU", FG) + 57.6; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S05.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 6      REDUCE SLOPING LAND WITH 869 M2 
*                CONSTRUCT NEW TERRACES WITH SPRING AND SUMMER IRRIGATION 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone,fg) = landold(zone,fg); 
 
*reduce sloping of 869 m2 per household 
land("sloping", fg) = landold("sloping", fg) - 869; 
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*Add ?? m2 of IRRTER_SP 
land("IRRTER_SP", FG) = landold("IRRTER_SP", FG) + 29.8; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S06.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*SCENARIO 7      REDUCE SLOPING LAND 1650 M2 ONLY FOR RICH 
*                CONVERT IRRIGATED LOWLAND SUMMER TO SPRING + SUMMER 
*------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Restore base scenario of land 
land(zone,fg) = landold(zone,fg); 
 
*reduce sloping of 1650 m2 per non-poor households 
land("sloping", nonpoor) = landold("sloping", nonpoor) - 1650; 
 
*convert IRRTER_SU en IRRTER_SP for those who have terrases mainly 
land("IRRTER_SU", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.9; 
land("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) = landold("IRRTER_SP", wiTer) + landold("IRRTER_SU", wiTer)*0.1; 
 
*convert IRRPAD_SU en IRRPAD_SP for those who have mainly paddies 
land("IRRPAD_SU", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.9; 
land("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) = landold("IRRPAD_SP", woTer) + landold("IRRPAD_SU", woTer)*0.1; 
 
SOLVE FHHYENBAI USING LP MAXIMIZING vUT; 
EXECUTE_UNLOAD 'S07.gdx' srSOLV, srMODEL, srOBJ, srLAND, srCROP, srPROD, srCASHOBJ, 
srSALE, srPURC, srCONS, srBUYLAB, srSALLAB, srCASHBEG, srBORROW, 
srRSHORT, srSALLABCASH, srPURCASH, srCROPSALE, srCASHEND, srLAND; 
 
 
